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JUDICIAL REVIEW OF COPYRIGHT TERM
EXTENSION LEGISLATION
Dennis S. Karjala*
I. INTRODUCTION
In adopting the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act
(CTEA),' Congress acceded to the demands of noncreative heirs and
assignees of old but unexpired copyrights for extension of the period
of copyright protection by twenty years. This legislation thus allows
these copyright owners twenty more years to collect royalties and
control performance and dissemination of the covered works. At the
same time, Congress extended the term prospectively for works cre-
ated in the future. Both prospective and retroactive term extensions,
but particularly the latter, raise the question of the scope of congres-
sional power under Article I, Section 1, Clause 8 of the Constitution
(the "Intellectual Property Clause").2 Specifically, does such legisla-
tion conflict with the congressional power "to promote the Progress
of Science" and does it ignore the constitutional restriction on that
power mandating that exclusive rights granted under the Clause en-
dure only for "limited Times"?
Lurking beneath these substantive issues of constitutional law,
however, is the question of who decides them. Congress, evidently,
has made the decision that the CTEA comports with its powers under
* Willard H. Pedrick Distinguished Research Scholar and Professor of
Law, Arizona State University. The author is grateful to the Law Faculty of
the University of British Columbia and Dean Joost Blom for providing office
and logistical support during the writing of this Article. The author also grate-
fully acknowledges many helpful comments on earlier drafts by Professors
Dan Coenen, Ira Ellman, Lawrence Lessig, and Malla Pollack.
1. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, tit. I,
112 Stat. 2827 (1998).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (Congress has the power "To promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discover-
ies.").
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the Intellectual Property Clause. A fundamental issue in Eldred v.
Ashcroft, 3 therefore, is the scope of judicial review of copyright term
extension legislation: Do the courts have the power, and if so should
they exercise it, to second-guess congressional legislation that di-
rectly raises questions concerning the meaning of substantive consti-
tutional language? Resolution of this fundamental issue involves
two basic subissues. The first is the degree, if any, to which the
Court should independently review the factual record and conclu-
sions drawn by Congress therefrom. The second is the standard of
review the Court applies to the facts that it chooses to consider.
Everyone is familiar with the many legitimate arguments that
the legislature is better equipped to make policy judgments, balance
policy tensions, and collect the factual information necessary to mak-
ing those determinations. In the case of the CTEA, Congress heard
testimony concerning increased incentives for the creation of new
works-arguments saying, essentially, "[t]erm extension makes
copyright protection stronger, and stronger protection means a higher
incentive to create." 4 CTEA proponents also claimed other advan-
tages for term extension, such as a costless flow of additional royalty
income from Europe to the United States ("U.S."). 5 On the other
hand, Congress received testimony from opponents of term exten-
sion, arguing that the statute would not encourage creativity and that
the other supposed goals were neither achieved by the proposed stat-
ute nor would benefit the public in the constitutionally required way
of "promot[ing] the Progress of Science."
6
If Eldred were a Commerce Clause 7 case (at least prior to Lo-
pez8 and Morrison9), a routine application of the rational basis test l
would lead to upholding the CTEA's constitutionality, on the ground
that Congress heard various and opposing viewpoints and decided
among them. However, the challenge to the CTEA is an Intellectual
3. Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618 (U.S. oral argument Oct. 9, 2002).
4. See infra notes 35, 64 and accompanying text.
5. See infra notes 45, 50 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 69, 77-79 and accompanying text.
7. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 (Congress has the power "To regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes.").
8. Unites States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
9. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
10. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 (1938).
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Property Clause"I case. That Clause is textually, historically, and le-
gally distinguishable from the Commerce Clause. It does not raise
the difficult interpretation issues that the Commerce Clause has en-
gendered.
The legislative process of copyright term extension further dis-
tinguishes this case from the Commerce Clause cases. While the
Court has split deeply over whether the political process is sufficient
to protect constitutional values of federalism under the commerce
power, any realistic view of how the CTEA was adopted reveals that
the constitutional issues arising out of the Intellectual Property
Clause were not balanced in the legislative process. A review of the
record shows that Congress listened to a relatively small number of
owners of old copyrights and chose to bestow upon those owners a
windfall at an incalculable but heavy cost to the diffuse public.
These costs come in the form of royalty transfer payments during the
extended period and in the form of a reduced number of new creative
works by current authors because of the diminished public domain
and the transaction costs of licensing many old works. Analysis of
the realities of the legislative process thus leaves no doubt that Con-
gress did not seek to fulfill the constitutionally mandated purpose "to
promote the Progress of Science" in enacting the CTEA. It also con-
firms that to leave Congress as the sole interpreter of critical limita-
tions on congressional power, like the "limited Times" provision, is
equivalent to eradicating those limitations from the Constitution.
The Court should therefore be willing to form an independent judg-
ment concerning the real reasons for the congressional action, as op-
posed to the reasons formally offered.
The second question, which arises regardless of whether the
Court takes at face value the record before Congress, is the standard
of review that should be applied. The CTEA, at least insofar as it
applies retroactively to works already in existence, cannot survive
any test for review that is stronger than a rubber-stamp version of
"rational basis" (if, indeed, it can survive rational basis analysis).' 2
11. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
12. Retroactive extension (term extension for works already in existence)
appears to conflict on its face with specific constitutional language (that the
copyright term be for a "limited Time[]" and that copyright law "promote the
Progress of Science"). Id. Upholding the statute would render nugatory both
of these specific constitutional limitations on congressional power to grant ex-
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Rational basis was adopted as a test in Commerce Clause cases be-
cause of the difficulties in interpreting the scope of the term "com-
merce" and the apparent practical need to allow Congress to regulate
an increasingly national economy. In recent years the Court has split
over the issue of whether there is a way to place some real limits on
that scope, in the interest of preserving the basic federal structure of
the U.S.' 3 Both the majority and the dissenters in these cases agree,
however, that the Supreme Court is the final arbiter of the meaning
of the term "commerce." 14  The disagreement is primarily over
whether, as a practical matter, an interpretation of the scope of the
term "commerce" is possible that preserves federalism while leaving
some realms of regulatory activity solely to the states without raising
the problems that led to the pre-1930s restrictive view of the federal
'5
commerce power.
The limitations contained in the Intellectual Property Clause, on
the other hand, are not aimed at preserving federalism. 16 The limita-
tions on congressional power in the Intellectual Property Clause were
intended to ensure that Congress itself does not fall prey to the temp-
tation to grant exclusive rights in writings or inventions where the
grant is not for a "limited Time" or does not "promote the Progress
of Science [or] useful Arts." They are express substantive limita-
tions on federal power. If the Supreme Court does not ensure that
congressional action purportedly taken under this power complies
clusive intellectual property rights. The Supreme Court is the ultimate arbiter
of the meaning of constitutional language. Even if we could assume that the
political process was balanced, no rational justification for extending the terms
of existing copyrights was presented to Congress that comports with the re-
quirements of the Intellectual Property Clause.
13. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 627; Lopez, 514 U.S. at 567.
14. Compare Morrison, 529 U.S. at 614 (quoting earlier cases to the effect
that whether particular operations affect interstate commerce sufficiently to
come within congressional power under the commerce clause is ultimately a
judicial question), with id. at 651 n.19 (Souter, J., dissenting) (agreeing "that
politics is the arbiter of state interests only within the realm of legitimate con-
gressional action under the commerce power.").
15. See id. at 660 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("This consideration [that virtually
all local activity could be regulated under the 'substantial effects' test], how-
ever, while serious, does not reflect a jurisprudential defect, so much as it re-
flects a practical reality.").
16. Indeed, in the copyright arena, Congress has preempted all state protec-
tion that gives equivalent rights to works constituting copyright subject matter.
See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2001).
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with these limitations, our system of checks and balances is thrown
aside and Congress alone determines the meaning of constitutional
language limiting its enumerated power.
This does not mean that the Court should second-guess the myr-
iad policy balances that Congress has drawn in writing the Copyright
Act. Most of the statute deals with the types of exclusive rights that
Congress has chosen to recognize, limitations on those rights, and
means for their enforcement. These provisions do not trench upon
the "limited Times" restriction nor can any serious challenge be
mounted, at least in general, that they fail to "promote the Progress
of Science."'17 It does mean, however, that the Court should inde-
pendently review the bases on which Congress acts to ensure that
there is good reason to believe that Congress acted with the constitu-
tionally mandated goals in mind and that Congress had a reasonable
basis to believe that its action would further those goals through con-
stitutionally permitted means. There is nothing in the record to show
that Congress had a reasonable basis for believing that retroactive ex-
tension would promote the progress of science. Nor is there anything
in the record to show that Congress tried to find any meaning for the
phrase "limited Times" other than the abstract dictionary definition
"mathematically finite,"' 8 unrelated to the context of the Clause as a
whole or the Framers' intended purpose of the "limited Times" re-
striction. 19 Nor did Congress pay anything more than lip service to
the question of whether prospective extension would increase crea-
tion incentives or otherwise meet the constitutionally mandated goal
of "promot[ing] the progress of science."
Congress did hear from copyright owners holding rights to a
relatively small number of old but still valuable works who were
seeking desperately to keep their royalty streams flowing. If there
was a constitutionally valid reason for retroactive extension, we can
be sure that these representatives would have thought of and pre-
sented them. Consequently, the Court in Eldred can and should find,
17. See infra note 170.
18. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 854, 1393
(1961).
19. See infra notes 160-65 and accompanying text. Not even the Govern-
ment's Response Brief in the Supreme Court offers a standard for determining
what copyright terms would extend beyond a "limited Time." See Brief for the
Respondent, Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618 [hereinafter Brief for Respon-
dent].
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without remand, that retroactive extension under the CTEA was un-
constitutional (without necessarily determining the validity of any
prior retroactive extensions).20 Prospective extension is also difficult
to uphold on the present record. Congress heard no testimony that
prospective extension would constitute a creation incentive other
than bald statements to that conclusory effect. Nobody came before
Congress seeking prospective extension alone, and Congress thought
so little of prospective term extension by itself that it did not even
bother to insert a severability clause in an attempt to disconnect it
from the more problematic retroactive term extension. The entire
term extension bill was also intimately tied together with the Fairness
in Music Licensing Act, which could not have been adopted as a
free-standing measure and has now been determined to place the
U.S. in violation of its international trade obligations.2 ' Thus, the
20. Whether prior retroactive extensions were constitutional is not an issue
presented by Eldred. The nineteen-year extension effected by the 1976 Copy-
right Act would surely be called into question if the CTEA is held unconstitu-
tional. There can be little doubt that the same, rent-seeking forces were at
work in support of the 1976 Act extension, and the various shorter extensions
that preceded it, which should make it constitutionally suspect. The reasoning
presented herein, however, would require separate consideration of what in-
formation was before Congress at the time of the adoption of the 1976 Act.
Not only was that a comprehensive revision of the entire statute, but it was also
adopted with a view to eventual entry into the Berne Convention by the U.S..
21. For reasons strictly related to the U.S. legislative process, copyright
term extension and the so-called "Fairness in Music Licensing Act" (FMLA)
were adopted as titles I and II, respectively, of the same bill. Sonny Bono
Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, tits. I & II, 112 Stat.
2827 (1998). The FMLA amended section 110(5) of the Copyright Act to pro-
vide a greater exemption to perform music publicly in restaurants, bars, and
retail establishments. Early on in the legislative process, Representative Sen-
senbrenner of the House Subcommittee stated that he would not look favorably
on term extension without action on the theoretically unrelated issue of music
licensing. See 1995 House Hearings, infra note 25, at 156. Although Senator
Hatch, Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, opposed expanding the ex-
emption for the public performance of music, Mr. Sensenbrenner was quoted
as saying, "If they want to separate the two issues, it won't happen." Alan K.
Ota, Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars, CQ WEEKLY, Aug. 8,
1998, at 2167. Eventually, the House passed the CTEA with the FMLA added
as a floor amendment, and a conference committee left it in the final product.
That is not the end of the story, however. The European Union com-
plained that the amendment to section 110(5) effected by the FMLA violated
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, in-
cluding Trade in Counterfeit Goods (TRIPs). A WTO panel decided against
the U.S. in June 2000. See World Trade Organization, Report of the Panel,
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Court should overturn the CTEA in its prospective aspect as well,
giving Congress another try at adopting prospective extension if
Congress concludes that it is in the public interest and can find con-
stitutionally valid bases for acting. 22 By "remanding" to the legisla-
ture, the Court would recognize the basic policymaking role of Con-
gress in our democratic society while maintaining its own special
role in interpreting the meaning of the Constitution.
Part II of this Article attempts to summarize the evidence before
Congress on the basis of which the CTEA was adopted. Part III ar-
gues that any independent review of that evidence must conclude that
none of the justifications of the CTEA offered by Congress can be
the real reason for the congressional action. Part IV concludes that
the only viable inference from an independent reading of the evi-
dence before Congress was that Congress gave in to the demands of
the heirs and assignees of old copyrights that still had economic
United States-Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R (June
15, 2000). The Panel Report was adopted by the Dispute Settlement Body.
World Trade Organization, Action by the Dispute Settlement Body,
WT/DS 160/8, IP/D/I 6/Add. 1 (July 31, 2000). As of this writing, sanctions are
being arbitrated. World Trade Organization, Recourse by the European Com-
munities and its Member States to Article 22.6 of the DSU, WT/DS160/21
(Feb. 19, 2002). Because the FMLA had no majority support from either the
House Subcommittee or the Senate Judiciary Committee, it is a bill that could
never have been adopted on its own. It was passed only because Representa-
tive Sensenbrenner was successful in getting it tied to copyright term exten-
sion, apparently on the theory that if Congress gives something to one set of
special copyright interests, it may take away something from another set (mu-
sic authors) for the benefit of yet a third lobbying group (restaurant and bar
owners). While the country benefited from Representative Sensenbrenner's
tactics, which delayed the CTEA for two or perhaps three years and thereby
allowed works from 1920-22 to enter the public domain, and while there may
be some merit to an expanded exemption for the public performance of music,
the FMLA has put the U.S. in violation of its international trade agreements.
The Eldred case is a good opportunity for the Court to clear the decks and al-
low Congress to act on the essentially unrelated issues of prospective term
extension and music licensing (in the light of developments at the WTO) on
their individual merits.
22. This "structural" approach to judicial review of term extension legisla-
tion, which overturns enacted legislation but leaves Congress free to try again
in the light of constitutional demands articulated by the judicial branch, is not
new to the Court. Professor Coenen has shown that structural review in this
sense pervades constitutional law. Dan T. Coenen, A Constitution of Collabo-
ration: Protecting Fundamental Values with Second-Look Rules of Interbranch
Dialogue, 42 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1575, 1834, 1869-70 (2001).
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value but were about to enter the public domain. Part V amplifies
the claims made above,23 that the powers granted to Congress by the
Intellectual Property Clause require an approach to judicial review
different from that used in Commerce Clause cases. In particular,
the express limitations on federal power contained in the Intellectual
Property Clause can only have their intended constitutional force and
meaning if legislation adopted under the Clause is independently
scrutinized by the judiciary and determined not to violate those limi-
tations.
II. WHAT CONGRESS HEARD AND CONCLUDED CONCERNING TERM
EXTENSION
Hearings were held in 1995 on proposed copyright term exten-
sion legislation by the Senate Judiciary Committee24 and the House
Judiciary Committee's Subcommittee on Courts and Intellectual
Property. 25 The House Subcommittee held additional hearings in
1997.26 The Senate Judiciary Committee issued a Report in 1996,27
and the House Subcommittee issued a Report in 1998.28 Both reports
recommended adoption of what eventually became the CTEA. The
1998 House Subcommittee Report offers only brief conclusions as its
reasons for supporting term extension,29 so the emphasis here will be
23. Supra notes 7-16 and accompanying text.
24. Copyright Term Extension Act of 1995: Hearing on S. 483 Before the
Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th Cong. (1995) [hereinafter 1995 Senate
Hearing].
25. Copyright Term, Film Labeling, and Film Preservation Legislation:
Hearings on H.R. 989, H.R. 1248 and H.R. 1734 Before the Subcomm. on
Courts and Intellectual Prop. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th
Cong (1995) [hereinafter 1995 House Hearings].
26. Pre-1978 Distribution of Recordings Containing Musical Composi-
tions; Copyright Term Extension; And Copyright Paper Program Licenses:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop. of the House
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. (1997) [hereinafter 1997 House Hear-
ing].
27. S. REP. No. 104-315 (1996) [hereinafter 1996 Senate Report], available
at http://www.law.asu.edu/HomePages/Karjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/
legmats/s483rep 104-315.html (last visited August 23, 2002).
28. H.R. REP. No. 105-452 (1998) [hereinafter 1998 House Report].
29. After referring to the action of the EU and its mandatory rule of the
shorter term, the Report states that extension: "[W]ill ensure that profits gen-
erated from the sale of U.S. intellectual property abroad will come back to the
United States." Id. at 4. It goes on to say, "Extending copyright protection
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF THE CTEA
on the 1996 Senate Report and the evidence (before both bodies)
supporting its conclusions. The reasons offered in the Senate Report
were the ineffectiveness of current terms to afford adequate or fair
protection to creators and their heirs,30 the extension in Europe 31 and
the asserted need for international harmonization, 32 the benefits to in-
ternational trade,33 the substantially increased commercial lives of
works due to growth in communications technologies 34 and a sup-
posed concomitant increased incentive for the creation of new
works35 and incentives to preserve and digitize existing works. 36 As
will be an incentive for U.S. authors to continue using their creativity to pro-
duce works, and provide copyright owners generally with the incentive to re-
store older works and further disseminate them to the public. Authors will be
able to pass along to their children and grandchildren the financial benefits of
their works." Id.
30. 1996 Senate Report, supra note 27, at 6, 10-11.
31. Id. at 6-7. The Report lists the EU extension as "[p]erhaps most impor-
tant[]," noting that "[f]ailure on the part of the United States to provide equal
protection for works in the United States will result in a loss for American
creators and the economy of the benefits of twenty years of international copy-
right protection that they might otherwise have." Id. The Report uses Ger-
many as an example of how the "rule of the shorter term" would limit protec-
tion of U.S. works made for hire in that country to the seventy-five year U.S.
term instead of the life-plus-70-year German term. Id. at 15-16. This example
is particularly inapt, because the EU Directive makes an exception from the
mandatory rule of the shorter term for EU members who are bound by preex-
isting treaty obligations recognizing a longer term. Council Directive
93/98/EEC of 29 October 1993, art. 7(3). Therefore, U.S. works are protected
in Germany for the full life-plus-70-year term regardless of the U.S. term.
Copyright Agreement with Germany, 27 Stat. 1021, Jan. 15, 1892, art. I (pro-
viding for unrestricted national treatment), reproduced verbatim in Presidential
Proclamation No. 24, 27 Stat. 1021, April 15, 1892 (declaring subjects of
Germany to be eligible for the benefits of U.S. copyright); see also Wilhelm
Nordemann, The Term of Protection for Works by U.S. -American Authors in
Germany, 44 J. COPR. SOC'Y, 1 (Fall 1996). Similarly, the U.K. term for pre-
1996 U.S. works is a minimum of life-plus-50 years. See Dennis S. Karjala,
Statement of Copyright and Intellectual Property Law Professors in Opposi-
tion to H.R. 604, H.R. 2589, and S.505, Submitted to the Committees on the
Judiciary, United States Senate, United States House of Representatives, Janu-
ary 28, 1998, at 17-18 [hereinafter Opposition Statement], available at
http://www.law.asu.edu/HomePages/Karjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/
legmats/1998Statement.html#Economic costs (last visited August 23, 2002).
32. 1996 Senate Report, supra note 27, at 7-9.
33. Id. at 7-10, 16-17.
34. Id. at 6, 12.
35. Id. at 11-13. The Report asserts an incentive to create "new and deriva-
tive works" by explicitly denying a reduced incentive from income to be
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is discussed below, only the latter two reasons are potentially rele-
vant to the constitutional goal of "promot[ing] the Progress of Sci-
ence." Yet, only conclusory testimony of interested parties argued
that term extension would lead to new creativity, without meeting
any of the economic arguments demonstrating that prospective ex-
tension could not increase incentives. Nor did any CTEA proponent
attempt to show how extension for existing works would have a posi-
tive effect on preservation or digitization of existing works that the
copyright owner had not bothered to preserve or digitize before the
copyright expired.
A. Adequate or Fair Protection for Authors and their Heirs
The Senate Report is laced with the notion of supplying a "fair
economic return" for authors and their dependents or heirs.37 The
Report, however, does not offer a standard of "fairness" at all, let
alone seek to determine a standard of fairness from the constitutional
power to "promote the Progress of Science., 38 The Report cites uni-
formity of copyright laws as helping "to ensure the greatest possible
exploitation of the commercial value of these works in world markets
received "many years down the road." Id. at 12. It also asserts that authors
who license their works can receive the full present value of the projected in-
come stream. Id. This is, of course, true (except for the Report's failure to ob-
serve that no purchaser of a license will bargain for more than 35 years, be-
cause of inalienable termination rights). The problem is that the "full present
value" is not increased by an extension that kicks in so "many years down the
road." See infra note 69 and accompanying text. The Report thus flunks Eco-
nomics 101. For existing works, the added incentive is supposed to be "in-
come with which to subsidize the creation of new works." Id. It mentions no
mechanism for insuring that the extra income will indeed be used for this pur-
pose. See infra note 113 and accompanying text.
36. 1996 Senate Report, supra note 27, at 13.
37. Id. at 3, 4, 6, 9.
38. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. Again, the contrast with the Commerce
Clause is crucial. In general economic regulation, Congress implicitly deter-
mines "fairness" by including some things and excluding others from a stat-
ute's coverage. This does not render the legislation vulnerable to constitu-
tional attack. The Intellectual Property Clause, however, contains express
limitations on congressional power and defines the power itself as one "to
promote the Progress of Science." Legislation adopted under the Clause must
be justified in terms of the express power and the express limitations on that
power contained in the Clause. If "fairness" to authors or inventors is to be a
legitimate goal of the Clause, it must therefore be derived from the express
power "to promote the Progress of Science." Id.
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for the benefit of U.S. copyright owners and their dependents." 39 It
thus seems to be treating benefit to copyright owners and their de-
pendents as a primary goal of the extension. Many witnesses testi-
fied before Congress that copyright law was designed to protect the
copyright owners for a period covering the lives of two generations
of descendants of the creative author and that increased life expec-
tancies had rendered the current term insufficient to achieve this
goal.n0 Others testified more generally that the current terms did not
protect copyright owners for an adequate or reasonable time.41 No
statistical evidence was offered, however, to show that the increased
life expectancy was not already reflected in the prospective life-plus-
50-year term because of the increased longevity of authors them-
selves, or to show that on average creative authors were having chil-
dren later in life (let alone twenty years later). While Irving Berlin
was offered as an example of a creative author who saw copyrights
on some of his works expire in his own lifetime,42 no evidence was
presented to show that Irving Berlin's children or grandchildren did
not benefit from the wealth amassed by their creative forebear from
exploitation of his works.
More importantly, no one offered any basis in law for the "life
plus two generations" argument or tried to relate it to the constitu-
tional mandate to "promote the Progress of Science." Nobody at-
tempted to relate the "life plus two generations" argument to the de-
mand for an increase in the term for works made for hire, in which
the author is generally a corporation that has no descendants. 43 It is
39. 1996 Senate Report, supra note 27, at 8.
40. 1995 Senate Hearing, supra note 24, at 44 (presentation of Alan Men-
ken); id. at 55 (statement of Bob Dylan); id. at 59 (statement of Ellen
Donaldson); id. at 140 (resolution of ABA Section of Intellectual Property
Law); id. at 143-44 (letter from Alison Fine); see also 1995 House Hearings,
supra note 25, at 272 (statement of Mary Ellin Barrett); id. at 628 (joint state-
ment of the Coalition of Creators and Copyright Owners); see also 1997 House
Hearing, supra note 26, at 36 (testimony of George David Weiss).
41. 1995 Senate Hearing, supra note 24, at 57-58 (statement of Carlos
Santana); id. at 57 (letter from Stephen Sondheim); see also 1997 House Hear-
ing, supra note 26, at 133 (statement of Hoagy Bix Carmichael).
42. See 1996 Senate Report, supra note 27, at 10.
43. The Senate Report shifts gears in the case of works made for hire, de-
fending term extension for them based on the benefits to international trade
and the increased commercial lives of works. See id. at 16-17.
Fall 2002]
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thus one of those catchy phrases that sounds appealing but reveals it-
self upon analysis to be without foundation in U.S. jurisprudence.
4 4
B. International Harmonization
The Senate Report cites the "international movement" towards a
term of life-plus-70 years and the loss to American creators and to
the economy of the benefits they would otherwise have as perhaps
the most important reason for term extension in the U.S. 45 The Reg-
ister of Copyrights is quoted, as saying that harmonization of na-
tional copyright laws is "crucial" and predicting that a life-plus-70-
year term will be the world standard "at some point in the future. 46
The Report states that the copyright industries account for 5.7 per-
cent of the total gross domestic product and are creating jobs at twice
the rate of other industries. 47 It sees the U.S. as losing a significant
trade advantage if it fails to keep pace with the emerging interna-
tional standards. 48 It asserts that Europe's adoption of the rule of the
shorter term will cause American works to fall into the public do-
main twenty years before those of our trading partners unless the
44. One strongly pro-CTEA witness, Commissioner of Patents and Trade-
marks Bruce A. Lehman, indirectly revealed how little concern he had for even
the first generation of an author's heirs. Senator Brown sent some post-hearing
questions to some of the witnesses. Question I had to do with whether the bill
should be altered "to pass along the benefit of a term extension to the creators
of works, rather than the consumers of their labors." In stating the Administra-
tion's opposition to an amendment designed to effect this, Mr. Lehman re-
sponded, "For virtually all pre-1978 works and all post-1978 works (other than
works made for hire) the creators of works will have long been dead when the
additional twenty-year copyright period begins. Thus, the actual beneficiaries
of the twenty-year extension would not be the author, but rather the author's
heirs." 1995 Senate Hearing, supra note 24, at 117. Mr. Lehman's opposition
thus implicitly discards even a "one generation" argument, favoring current
copyright owners over the original author's heirs.
Professor Sterk has written more generally on how the rhetoric about "au-
thors" and their supposed just desserts has influenced and supported the great
expansions of copyright protection we have seen, especially with and since the
adoption of the 1976 Copyright Act. See Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Real-
ity in Copyright Law, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1197 (1996).
45. 1996 Senate Report, supra note 27, at 6-7.
46. 1995 Senate Hearing, supra note 24, at 8, 20 (prepared statement of
Marybeth Peters), quoted in 1996 Senate Report at 8.
47. 1996 Senate Report, supra note 27, at 9.
48. Id.
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U.S. also extends its term.49 A long parade of witnesses and state-
ments to Congress made assertions in support of these conclusions.
50
None of the pro-CTEA witnesses arguing that harmonization
called for term increases in the U.S. attempted to show how har-
monization of term would benefit anyone in the U.S. other than own-
ers of old but still valuable copyrights. Indeed, "harmonization"
cannot be considered a serious motivating factor, in view of the de-
monstrable fact that the only important class of works to which the
CTEA achieved harmonization of term consists of those created after
1977 by individual authors, who have a life-plus-70-year term in
both the European Union ("EU") and the U.S. 51 The earliest any
49. Id.
50. On the importance of international harmonization, see 1995 Senate
Hearing, supra note 24, at 4-5 (statement of Senator Feinstein that interna-
tional harmonization is the "most compelling" reason for the legislation); id. at
23 (testimony of Bruce A. Lehman that international harmonization is the
"primary reason" for the bill); id. at 59-60 (statement of Ellen Donaldson ); id.
at 132-34 (joint prepared statement of the Coalition of Creators and Copyright
Owners); id. at 143-44 (letter from Alison Fine); id. at 147 (letter from Jona-
than Tasini); see also 1995 House Hearings, supra note 25, at 75 (testimony of
Edward P. Murphy).
On the importance to U.S. trade interests, see 1995 Senate Hearing, supra
note 24, at 25 (testimony of Bruce A. Lehman); id. at 42 (testimony of Jack
Valenti); id. at 46 (statement of Mary Rodgers); id. at 59 (statement of Ellen
Donaldson ); id. at 64 (statement of Shana Alexander); id. at 138 (statement of
the American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers ); id. at 162
(statement of Edward P. Murphy); 1995 House Hearings, supra note 25, at 57
(testimony of Marilyn Bergman); id. at 205 (testimony of Charlene Barshef-
sky); id. at 594 (memorandum dated July 10, 1995 from Shira Perlmutter to
Jack Valenti); id. at 616 (joint statement of the Coalition of Creators and Copy-
right Owners); 1997 House Hearing, supra note 26, at 134 (statement of
Hoagy Bix Carmichael).
On the supposed deleterious effect of Europe's adoption of the rule of the
shorter term, see 1995 Senate Hearing, supra note 24, at 6 (testimony of
Marybeth Peters); id. at 56 (statement of Bob Dylan ); id. at 56 (letter of Don
Henley); id. at 59 (statement of Ellen Donaldson ); id. at 142 (statement of
George David Weiss); id. at 143-44 (letter from Alison Fine); 1995 House
Hearings, supra note 25, at 109 (testimony of Martha Coolidge); id. at 234
(testimony of Quincy Jones); id. at 243 (statement of Alan Menken ); id. at 273
(statement of Mary Ellin Barrett); id. at 511-12 (resolution of ABA Section of
Intellectual Property in support of H.R. 989); id. at 639 (letter dated June 2,
1995, from Michael K. Kirk); 1997 House Hearing, supra note 26, at 46 (tes-
timony of Fritz Attaway); id. at 133 (statement of Hoagy Bix Carmichael).
51. See Dennis S. Karjala, Chart Showing Changes Made and the Degree
of Harmonization Achieved and Disharmonization Exacerbated by the Sonny
Fall 2002]
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAWREVIEW [Vol. 36:199
disharmony of terms can exist for these post-1977 works is 2028.52
That the U.S. terms might be longer under the CTEA does not elimi-
nate any of the disharmony that results when the U.S. term expires at
a different time from that of some other country. Because the U.S.
term for works made for hire is in any event a fixed number of years,
it can never be harmonized with the term in any country that follows
a life-plus system for determining the term. Similarly, the U.S. term
for pre-1978 works even by individuals is a fixed number of years
both before and after the CTEA (seventy-five and ninety-five respec-
tively). Consequently, the harmonization argument is of no current
importance for post-1977 works and is only intelligible for pre-1978
works as a plea for more money to the owners of copyrights in those
works. 53 No CTEA proponent attempted to deal with these irrepara-
ble flaws in the "harmonization" argument.
Moreover, even treating "harmonization" as a code word for
more money to U.S. copyright owners, no one presenting evidence to
Congress on the supposed advantages in international trade made the
crucial distinction between trade in old works and trade in current
works, such as blockbuster new movies, to which term extension has
no effect on the trade balance because the works are protected in any
Bono Copyright Term Extension Act (CTEA), at
http://www.law.asu.edu/HomePages/Karjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/
legmats/HarmonizationChartDSK.html (last visited July 15, 2002). Even the
pro-CTEA Register of Copyrights conceded that the bill did not completely
harmonize on term. 1995 Senate Hearing, supra note 24, at 20 (testimony of
Marybeth Peters).
52. Copyright in a work created in 1978 by an author who died in that year
would expire at the end of 2028 under the pre-CTEA life-plus-50-year term. It
will continue until 2048 under the CTEA's life-plus-70-year term.
53. Some of the testimony was quite explicit to this effect. In addition to
those claiming an entitlement to protection for life of the author plus two gen-
erations, supra note 40, or that the current return to copyright owners was not
fair or reasonable, supra note 41, see 1995 Senate Hearing, supra note 24, at
47-52 (statement of Mary Rodgers-listing songs and musicals from 1920
whose loss to the public domain would be "devastating" to their owners); id. at
59 (statement of Ellen Donaldson-referring to her father's works as "our live-
lihoods"); id. at 63 (statement of Marsha Durham-relies on income as parale-
gal and royalties from her father's works to support her family); id. at 64
(statement of Shana Alexander-income on her own works is far less than that
from her father's); id. at 65 (statement of E. Randol Schoenberg-asserting "a
great loss" to composer's grandchildren if his works were to enter the public
domain); id. at 272 (statement of Mary Ellin Barrett-families will suffer if
works fall into the public domain while still commercially viable).
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event. The closest anyone came to this issue was Bruce A. Lehman,
Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks, who observed that the
works from 1920 to 1940 were about to enter the public domain and
that this is the time period in which American copyright-based indus-
tries came into worldwide preeminence. 54 Mr. Lehman did not sup-
ply any factual support for his implication that this meant a favorable
trade balance in old works "saved" from the public domain by the
CTEA. Nor did Congress make a study of the relative contribution
of old works and current works to the trade balance in copyright-
protected works, notwithstanding being urged to do so.
55
C. Increased Commercial Life of Works
The Senate Report mentions in several places a substantially in-
creased commercial life of creative works as a result of the growth in
communications media. 56 At one point, the Report seems to be ac-
cepting as a goal of U.S. copyright that the value of any such ex-
tended commercial life properly belongs to copyright owners and
their dependents. 57 However, the main thrust is that "afford[ing]
ample opportunity to exploit their works throughout the course of the
works' marketable lives" will increase the return on investment and
54. 1995 Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 24; 1995 House Hearings, su-
pra note 25, at 212.
55. 1995 Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 88 (statement of Dennis S.
Karjala on behalf of some forty-five copyright and intellectual property law
professors); 1995 House Hearings, supra note 25, at 417 (testimony of Dennis
S. Karjala). Charlene Barshefsky, Principal Deputy, U.S. Trade Representa-
tive, presented an estimate from the Motion Picture Association of America
that term extension would result in $1 million revenue increase from interna-
tional sources for 2000, a $3 million increase for 2010 and a $160-200 million
increase for 2020. Id. at 211 (statement of Charlene Barshefsky). She sup-
plied no factual foundation, however, and the conclusion can only be regarded
with extreme skepticism: It would mean that films from 1925 to 1945 would be
generating from international sources $160-200 million in the year 2020.
Such an outlandish claim requires more than citation to an estimate by a highly
interested party. Even this estimate shows, moreover, that there was no need
to rush into term extension now if improved trade balances were the goal. It
predicts (in 1995) only a $3 million increase for the year 2010, a full fifteen
years later.
56. 1996 Senate Report, supra note 27, at 6, 8, 12.
57. Id. at 8 (uniformity of copyright laws helps "to ensure the greatest pos-
sible exploitation of the commercial value of these works in world markets for
the benefit of U.S. copyright owners and their dependents.").
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thus strengthen incentives to creativity. 58 Some of the testimony and
submitted statements before Congress also assumed a longer com-
mercial life for works in general59 and would give the benefit of that
increase to the copyright owner on the ground of fairness or, in one
case, on the ground that it might increase incentives by subsidizing
the creation of new works.6' In fact, there was no evidence at all to
show that works in general have a longer commercial life than works
from the past. Shakespeare, Rembrandt, and Bach are the authors of
works that are used commercially today and would surely have
commercial value as works if they were protected by copyright. But
perhaps we may assume, along with Congress, that the new avenues
of exploitation through digital technology that make all works more
accessible will also allow them to live longer. The question is
whether the commercial benefits of any such assumed longer com-
mercial life should, under our copyright jurisprudence and the Con-
stitution, go to the original copyright owner or be shared among the
public.
D. Incentives for the Creation of New Works
The Senate Report, noting the extended commercial lives of
works, would give "American authors" the benefit of the new oppor-
tunities for exploitation of their works because "the promise of addi-
tional income will increase existing incentives to create new and de-
,62rivative works." The Report argues that the extended term is
valuable even to current authors because they wish to leave a legacy
to their children and grandchildren. If they transfer the copyright,
they will receive the present value of the projected income stream for
58. Id. at 12.
59. 1995 Senate Hearing, supra note 24, at 5 (statement of Senator Fein-
stein); id. at 135 (joint prepared statement of the Coalition of Creators and
Copyright Owners ); id. at 143 (statement of George David Weiss); 1995
House Hearings, supra note 25, at 630 (joint statement of the Coalition of
Creators and Copyright Owners).
60. 1995 Senate Hearing, supra note 24, at 18 (testimony of Marybeth Pe-
ters); id. at 44 (testimony of Alan Menken stating that many works fall into the
public domain while still commercially successful); id. at 59 (statement of
Ellen Donaldson complaining of the loss "of our works (our livelihoods) to
public domain, while they still have a viable commercial life").
61. 1995 Senate Hearing, supra note 24, at 18 (testimony of Marybeth Pe-
ters stating that the increased income may subsidize new works).
62. 1996 Senate Report, supra note 27, at 12.
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the longer term. According to the Report, extending the term will
also provide income that creative authors can use to subsidize the
creation of new works. 63 Much of the testimony and many state-
ments before Congress made general assertions to the effect that the
longer term would increase incentives to create new works.6 4 In ad-
dition, there was testimony that maintaining control over the work
for a longer period operated as an incentive.65 (There was also testi-
mony, even from proponents of the CTEA, that increasing the term
from life-plus-50 years to life-plus-70 years would not increase in-
centives.) 66 Some said that the extra money from the extended term
could be used to finance the creation of new works,67 although the
one time any witnesses were pressed on this issue, CTEA proponents
expressed an unwillingness to condition term extension on a showing
of new creativity.
68
63. Id.
64. 1995 Senate Hearing, supra note 24, at 57-58 (letter from Stephen
Sondheim); id. at 58 (statement of Mike Stoller); id. at 70, 95, 123 (testimony
and letter of Patrick Alger); id. at 57 (testimony of Marilyn Bergman); id. at 66
(statement of E. Randol Schoenberg); id. at 135 (joint statement of the Coali-
tion of Creators and Copyright Owners); id. at 141 (resolution and report of the
ABA Section of Intellectual Property Law); 1995 House Hearings, supra note
25, at 57 (testimony of Marilyn Bergman); id. at 590-93 (memorandum from
Shira Perlmutter to Jack Valenti); id. at 638 (letter from Michael K. Kirk);
1997 House Hearing, supra note 26, at 32 (testimony of Frances Preston); id.
at 48 (testimony of Fritz Attaway); id. at 517 (statement of Judith M. Saffer).
65. 1995 Senate Hearing, supra note 24, at 56-57 (statement of Don
Henley); id. at 99 (testimony of Alan Menken); 1995 House Hearings, supra
note 25, at 271 (statement of Betty Kern Miller).
66. 1995 Senate Hearing, supra note 24, at 62 (testimony of Marybeth Pe-
ters); id. at 32 (oral statement of Sen. Grassley); 1995 House Hearings, supra
note 25, at 420 (oral statement of Rep. Hoke). Bruce A. Lehman, Commis-
sioner of Patents and Trademarks, testified that the greater financial rewards
offered by extension might serve as an incentive to create more new works,
even if no particular author would create a work under a life-plus-70-year re-
gime that he would not have created under a life-plus-50-year regime. Id. at
26. This remark seems to be simply a slightly more sophisticated, or more
garbled, version of the "stronger copyright means more incentives" assertions.
67. 1995 Senate Hearing, supra note 24, at 5 (testimony of Marybeth Pe-
ters); id. at 90 (testimony of Jack Valenti); 1995 House Hearings, supra note
25, at 583 (letter from Paul Goldstein to Jack Valenti ); id. at 668-69 (article of
Lisa M. Brownlee).
68. At the Senate Hearing, Senator Leahy asked how Congress could insure
that term extension profits would be invested in additional creativity. See 1995
Senate Hearing, supra note 24, at 92. Alan Menken simply responded that au-
thors should receive the income from their works. Id. Patrick Alger said that
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None of the general statements to the effect that "stronger copy-
right increases incentives" attempted to deal with the explicitly pre-
sented analysis showing that, for current works, the additional twenty
years would add only a minuscule amount to the present value of the
copyright, and that when risk was factored in, the additional amount
was nil.69 Indeed, there was not even any testimony that focused
solely on prospective extension. None of the testimony asserting that
the extra money rolling in from retroactive term extension could be
used to finance the creation of new works gave any plausible theory
of just how that would work, such as showing that the extra money
would, in fact, be used to subsidize new creative projects that would
not have been undertaken were the investment required to come from
some other source. Nor did any of the CTEA supporters suggest that
we must rely on authors' integrity to donate money, or the right to use works,
voluntarily. Id. Jack Valenti said that the movie industry creates jobs and the
greater their revenues, the more solid would be their fiscal foundation. Id. at
92-93.
69. 1995 House Hearings, supra note 25, at 300 (statement of Dennis S.
Karjala). Even some proponents of the CTEA agreed that the extended term
did not increase creation incentives. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
Professor Paul Goldstein, in a letter to Jack Valenti that was inserted into the
House record, agreed that the discount of the benefits to present value was
proper but that social costs should also be similarly discounted and were
minimal. Id. at 582. This seems to assume, however, that minimal social cost
justifies giving exclusive copyright rights, even if they do not promote the pro-
gress of science. It would mean, for example, that Congress could grant to the
descendants of Mark Twain alive in, say, year 2200, a copyright in Huckle-
berry Finn, on the ground that it does not cost us much today. That turns the
constitutional regime upside down. Even more importantly, however, Profes-
sor Goldstein does not consider the social costs of the extension for existing
works. Those costs to the public domain-to the public in works not created
and in additional royalties paid-are paid today, and there is therefore no dis-
count to present value. Shira Perlmutter, in a memorandum to Jack Valenti
that was also made a part of the House record, simply stated that the extra
twenty years can make a real difference in total return. Id. at 591. The reason
offered in support of this statement is that many copyright owners have rights
to multiple works, so the cumulative total may be significant. Id. Works are
created one at a time, however. For each work, the question is whether the
additional twenty years adds anything to the expected return on investment.
The present value analysis shows that it does not. Creating twenty works or
even 200 at, say, Disney or other large corporate author does not change this.
Each work requires an investment of time, money, and creativity, and in each
case the corporate author has no reason to think that anything having present
value will be added to whatever return was expected in the absence of term
extension.
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Congress condition the availability of the extra twenty years on in-
vesting the proceeds in additional creativity. 70 Needless to say, the
only testimony suggesting that extension for existing works would
increase incentives for the creation of new works was only implicit
in the general statements that "stronger copyright increases incen-
tives." Nobody offering testimony of this type attempted to weigh
the costs to the public in royalty transfer payments or a diminished
public domain against this purported increased incentive.
A few witnesses suggested that an author has a greater incentive
to produce derivative works or exploit works more generally if the
underlying works are protected. 71 The argument is that exclusive
rights are necessary for a remake of a classic work, such as a film, in
order to justify the huge production and marketing expenses.
72
70. When Senator Leahy raised this question at the 1995 Senate Hearing,
the responses from CTEA supporters were that authors deserved the money
and that we would have to rely on their integrity for new works. See supra
note 68 and accompanying text. Senator Dodd, who was not a member of the
Judiciary Committee, submitted a prepared statement indicating an interest in
looking at recapturing the benefits of extended copyright terms for the purpose
of funding the National Endowments for the Arts and the Humanities. 1995
Senate Hearings, supra note 24, at 94 (statement of Senator Dodd). The Con-
gressional Research Service actually issued a report on proposals to charge
copyright owners a fee to obtain term extension, with the proceeds devoted to
promoting the arts. EDWARD RAPPAPORT, COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION:
ESTIMATING THE ECONOMIC VALUES, No. 98-144E, (1998) available at
http://www.senate.gov/-dpc/crs/reports/ascii/98-144 (last visited Aug. 23,
2002).
71. See 1995 Senate Hearing, supra note 24, at 34 (testimony of Bruce A.
Lehman suggesting that property rights are necessary as an incentive to take
already existing works and reuse them in new formats); 1995 House Hearings,
supra note 25, at 669 (article of Lisa M. Brownlee). Shira Perlmutter asserted
that CTEA opponents-in arguing that current derivative work authors would
have fewer building blocks available to them under the extended term-failed
to consider that these derivative work authors themselves would get the benefit
of the extended term for their original derivative works. See id. at 600 (memo-
randum from Shira Perlmutter to Jack Valenti). However, she fails to notice
that the negligible effect on incentives to current authorship produced by ex-
tending the term applies equally to all current authors, whether they are creat-
ing wholly original works or derivative works.
72. See 1995 House Hearings, supra note 25, at 669 (article of Lisa M.
Brownlee).
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Otherwise, competitive remakes would get a free ride on the renewal
of interest in the work generated by the first remake.73
E. Incentives to Preserve, Digitize, or Distribute Existing Works
The Senate Report asserts that extending existing terms (retroac-
tive extension) would strengthen incentives to preserve existing
works. 74 The argument is that because of the cost of restoring and
digitizing existing works, no one will have an incentive to make the
investment without an extended copyright term during which one's
investment can be returned. 75 A number of witnesses testified that
extension would supply an incentive to restore, digitize, or distribute
works that were about to fall into the public domain.7 6 Others testi-
fied that, in the case of films, copyright owners had historically
failed to preserve or restore works.77 Witnesses further testified that
many films of cultural and social value, but with little economic
value, were "orphan works" for which copyright ownership could not
be determined.78 In these cases term extension would inhibit, rather
than promote, film restoration by archivists and others who do it
more as a labor of love than for economic benefits.
79
F. Value of the Public Domain
While the 1996 Senate Report does not expressly rely on their
testimony, many witnesses disparaged the value of the public domain
73. See id. These arguments cannot withstand analysis. See infra notes
114-26 and accompanying text.
74. See 1996 Senate Report, supra note 27, at 3.
75. See id. at 13.
76. See 1995 Senate Hearing, supra note 24, at 26, 34 (statement and testi-
mony of Bruce A. Lehman); id. at 41-42 (testimony and statement of Jack
Valenti); id. at 45 (testimony of Alan Menken); id. at 143 (statement of George
David Weiss); 1995 House Hearings, supra note 25, at 593 (memorandum
from Shira Perlmutter to Jack Valenti); id. at 633 (joint statement of the Coali-
tion of Creators and Copyright Owners); 1997 House Hearing, supra note 26,
at 48 (testimony of Fritz Attaway).
77. See 1995 Senate Hearing, supra note 24, at 160 (letter from John Bel-
ton, Society for Cinema Studies); 1995 House Hearings, supra note 25, at 283
(testimony of John Belton).
78. See 1995 Senate Hearing, supra note 24, at 154 (letter from Larry Ur-
banski, American Film Heritage Association estimating that seventy-five per-
cent of the films from the 1920s are orphan works).
79. See 1995 Senate Hearing, supra note 24, at 160 (letter from John Bel-
ton, Society for Cinema Studies).
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with assertions that entry into the public domain did not benefit con-
sumers by reducing prices. 8 Or, if prices did decrease, quality gen-
erally decreased as well. The most colorful statements of this type
came from Jack Valenti,8 ' but there were many others.8 2 Some wit-
nesses went so far as to compare, wholly inaptly, a public domain
classic to a popular current work in an effort to demonstrate the
point.83  A few pro-CTEA witnesses acknowledged a potential or
80. Senator Brown's dissenting report contested the claims of CTEA pro-
ponents that term extension would not harm anyone. See 1996 Senate Report,
supra note 27, at 34.
81. E.g., 1995 Senate Hearing, supra note 24, at 42 (statement of Jack
Valenti):
Whatever work is not owned is a work that no one protects and pre-
serve [sic]. The quality of the print is soon degraded. There is no one
who will invest the funds for enhancement because there is no longer
an incentive to rehabilitate and preserve something that anyone can of-
fer for sale. A public domain work is an orphan. No one is responsi-
ble for its life. But everyone exploits its use, until that time certain
when it becomes soiled and haggard, barren of its previous virtues.).
82. 1995 Senate Hearing, supra note 24, at 25 (testimony of Bruce A.
Lehman); id. at 143 (statement of George David Weiss); 1995 House Hear-
ings, supra note 25, at 86 (testimony of Marilyn Bergman); id. at 141 (testi-
mony of Judith M. Saffer); id. at 213 (testimony of Bruce A. Lehman); id. at
272 (statement of Mary Ellin Barrett); id. at 584 (letter from Paul Goldstein to
Jack Valenti); id. at 598 (memorandum from Shira Perlmutter to Jack Valenti);
id. at 602 (article of Arthur R. Miller); id. at 633-34 (oint statement of the
Coalition of Creators and Copyright Owners); 1997 House Hearing, supra note
26, at 134 (statement of Hoagy Bix Carmichael).
83. 1995 House Hearings, supra note 25, at 235 (testimony of Quincy
Jones, comparing a John Grisham novel to a Tolstoy novel and a Pearl Jam CD
to a Beethoven CD); 1995 Senate Hearing, supra note 24, at 45 (testimony of
Alan Menken, comparing a John Grisham novel to Moby Dick and a Garth
Brooks CD to a recording of Mozart's Requiem in D Minor). On the inaptness
of these comparisons, see infra notes 102-08 and accompanying text. One
witness argued that movie theaters charge as much for movies based on public
domain works as for those based on copyrighted works. See 1995 Senate
Hearing, supra note 24, at 135 (joint prepared statement of the Coalition of
Creators and Copyright Owners). This comparison is even more inapt, because
a film based on a public domain work is itself copyright protected as a deriva-
tive work. It might also have been noted that theaters charge as much for a
film that costs $1 million to make as one that costs $50 million. Given such
economics in the film industry, any cost savings to the producer cannot be ex-
pected to be reflected in box office prices. At the margin, however, such costs
are likely to be reflected in the total number and types of films that are avail-
able. Many small film makers might well go ahead with a project if the
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theoretical loss in the creation of new works but primarily for the
purpose of denying or minimizing 8 5 this possibility. Others implied
that the opponents of term extension had the burden of proving that
such losses would occur.
8 6
G. Summary
Based on the evidence presented at the various hearings on
copyright term extension, Congress could have rationally concluded
that many owners of existing copyrights felt that the current terms
were unfair, unreasonable, or inadequate, either to supply financial
support to heirs through at least two generations or to permit those
heirs to control derivative works and performances based on popular
works. Congress had no evidence that the CTEA as proposed and
subsequently enacted would harmonize copyright terms for works
published prior to 1978 or for the important class of works made for
hire published after 1977. While the CTEA harmonized the post-
1977 term for works authored by individuals, not a single witness or
written statement argued in favor of a purely prospective extension
(or even an extension that would take effect for works created in
1978 or later). Congress had clear evidence that trade in intellectual
property is important to our international balance of payments. Nev-
ertheless, it heard no more than general conclusions or suppositions
concerning trade in those works most affected by the CTEA, namely,
works from the 1920s and 1930s. Congress heard much general tes-
timony that works now have extended commercial lives due to ad-
vances in communications technologies, but no studies were cited to
support this claim. Assuming that today works do generally have
underlying work were in the public domain but do something else when they
see the high transaction costs of copyright clearances.
84. Id. at 136 (joint prepared statement of the Coalition of Creators and
Copyright Owners asserting that there is no evidence that public domain status
leads to significant exploitation by way of derivative works).
85. Id. at 16 (statement of Marybeth Peters asserting that costs to the public
would be minimal so we should favor authors); 1995 House Hearings, supra
note 25, at 586 (letter from Paul Goldstein to Jack Valenti arguing that owners
have economic incentives to keep their works accessible for exploitation); but
see id. at 159 (testimony of Marybeth Peters that twenty-year freeze on works
entering the public domain would be a negative impact of the CTEA).
86. 1995 Senate Hearing, supra note 24, at 16 (statement of Marybeth Pe-
ters asserting the Copyright Office belief that no case has been made that ex-
tension would diminish the supply of new works).
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longer commercial lives, a number of witnesses testified that an ex-
tended exclusive copyright was important in ensuring wide dissemi-
nation of these works in a form that is most desirable to the public.
There was also evidence to the contrary, namely, that works in the
public domain are more likely to be exploited in a publicly desirable
form, because they are available to all, including those whose pas-
sion may lead them to restore and preserve works without the pros-
pect of exclusive rights in the end product. 87
A number of witnesses before Congress stated, in essence, that
an extended term meant stronger copyright protection and that
stronger protection would operate as an incentive to the creation of
new works. No witnesses attempted to rebut the argument that the
present value of the extended term to a current author is nil. No one
testified that any particular author had decided against undertaking
the creation of a new work that he would have undertaken had the
prospective term been life plus seventy years instead of the pre-
CTEA life-plus-50-year term. Obviously, Congress heard no evi-
dence indicating that retroactive extension would have any incentive
effect on the creation of those existing works. There was testimony
that the extra money that copyright owners would receive during the
extended twenty year term could be used to finance the creation of
new works. 88 Yet, no one offered a plausible economic theory to in-
dicate any likelihood that the extra money would flow in the direc-
tion of new authorial creativity. Additionally, no CTEA supporters
suggested that Congress should condition the extended term on proof
that the extra money would be used to support new works.
Many witnesses testified in general terms that property rights
were necessary as an incentive to preserve, digitize, restore, or dis-
tribute existing works. 89 However, testimony concerning restoration
was almost exclusively related to films.90 Except for digitization of
existing works, none of this testimony indicated why the pre-CTEA
seventy-five year period was insufficient in providing the necessary
incentive but a ninety-five year period would be sufficient. Even as
to digitization, no pro-CTEA witness sought to condition the
87. 1996 Senate Report, supra note 27, at 29, 34.
88. E.g., 1995 Senate Hearing, supra note 24, at 6 (testimony of Marybeth
Peters).
89. See supra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
90. See 1995 Senate Hearing, supra note 24, at 90-123.
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extended copyright on the production of an actual and accessible
digital version of the work in question.
III. EVALUATION OF THE EVIDENCE FAVORING THE CTEA IN TERMS
OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE
A. Fairness to Authors
If Congress can constitutionally extend copyright terms for the
purpose of giving adequate, fair, or reasonable financial returns to
the owners of existing copyrights, sufficient evidence was presented
to Congress on which it could have reasonably decided that the exist-
ing terms were not long enough. "Fairness" in this sense is a basic
policy question that Congress is better equipped to deal with than the
courts. While we should be suspicious that Congress might hear the
louder voices of rent seekers who benefit from term extension, this is
a problem with any welfare or wealth transfer measure. However,
Congress is not empowered under the Intellectual Property Clause
simply to enrich copyright owners. Such a goal, in itself, does not
"promote the Progress of Science" and, particularly for retroactive
extension, violates the constitutional mandate that the exclusive
rights of copyright be made for a "limited Time[]". 9
B. Maintenance ofAuthorial Control
Another goal of some CTEA proponents was to maintain control
over the use of their works.92 One can understand how an author
may find some uses of his or her creation improper or offensive, and
copyright (during its proper term) allows the copyright owner to en-
join any unlicensed production or performance. While there is some
merit to the argument that authorial control "promote[s] the Progress
of Science," on the theory that the author knows best what the work
"means" and therefore how it is best used and presented, the argu-
ment loses much of its force as that control passes to heirs and
91. See Brief for Petitioners at 17-23, Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618 [here-
inafter Petitioners Brief]; Brief of Intellectual Property Law Professors as
Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 8-14, Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618
[hereinafter Intellectual Property Professors Brief].
92. See 1995 Senate Hearing, supra note 24, at 142 (testimony of George
David Weiss).
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assignees. 93 No evidence was presented to Congress to show, for ex-
ample, that George Gershwin's nephews, who control the trust that
owns the Gershwin copyrights, have any more competence to under-
stand and convey the real "meaning" of his works than anyone else
who has listened to and studied Gershwin's works.94 Certainly the
distant descendants of Victor Hugo should not be able to prevent
Disney from polishing up the Hunchback's image.95 Nor is there any
reason to believe that the great-great-grandnephews of Jane Austen
are better qualified to determine current uses of her works than the
makers of the movie "Sense and Sensibility" or the television mini-
series "Pride and Prejudice."
96
93. Music critic Gerald Nachman gave a number of examples of the use of
copyright to prevent "misuse" of a particular piece, such as the refusal of Lo-
renz Hart's estate to use any of Hart's lyrics in a biography that mentioned
Hart's homosexuality, the refusal of the Ira Gershwin estate to license an al-
bum by Gershwin devotee Michael Feinstein, and the Leonard Bernstein es-
tate's refusal to allow a production of "On the Town" because it objected to a
dance number. See Gerald Nachman, Letter, Let's Say Enough to Copyright
Welfare, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 1995, available at http://www.law.asu.
edu/HomePages/Karjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/commentary/Nachman.
html.
94. Reports in the media indicate that the Gershwin Family Trust will not
license "Porgy and Bess" for performance by a white cast. See Dinitia Smith,
Immortal Words, Immortal Royalties? Even Mickey Mouse Joins the Fray,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 28, 1998, at A13, available at http://www.law.asu.edu/
HomePages/Karjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/commentary/smith.html
(discussing reluctance of Gershwin family license "Porgy and Bess" to white
casts); see also Gail Russell Chaddock, When Is Art Free?, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, June 11, 1998 at B 1, available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/durable/1998/06/1 1/p5 Is1 -csm.htm; Steve Zeitlin,
Strangling Culture with a Copyright Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1998, avail-
able at http://www.law.asu.edu/HomePages/Karjala/OpposingCopyright
Extension/commentary/zeitlin.html (discussing Gershwin Family Trust and
other copyright holders' control over copyrighted materials).
95. Clan of Victor Hugo Denounce Disney Film, Cm. TRIB., Mar. 11, 1997,
at 2, available at http://p8asb.p8archner.com/chicagotribune/index.html (Re-
porting that the descendants of Victor Hugo in France were "profoundly
shocked" at Disney's treatment of The Hunchback of Notre Dame and had de-
nounced the film as "commercial pillage of heritage." Related items in which
Disney has a proprietary interest, like toys and comic books, were labeled by
the Hugo heirs as "scandalous and obscene.").
96. Amy Stevens, Poor Jane Austen Didn't Live to See "Sense and Sensi-
bility," WALL ST. J., Mar. 25, 1996, at Al. A summary of the article and some
commentary are available at http://www.law.asu.edu/HomePages/Karjala/
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Moreover, using copyright as a tool of censorship would explic-
itly raise the many First Amendment issues created by term exten-
sion and force Congress to tailor its legislation to meet some legiti-
mate governmental objective while not burdening more speech than
necessary to achieve that objective.97 Here Congress has not offered
censorship as an objective, let alone defended censorship as a legiti-
mate objective under the Intellectual Property Clause. Furthermore,
the CTEA has not been tailored to insure that only those works in
danger of "misuse" are covered. On the contrary, the CTEA extends
the term for all works of all types, regardless of whether the works
have economic value and regardless of whether the copyright owner
is known or can be found.98 Consequently, while Congress saw evi-
dence of a desire for copyright-owner control over the use and pres-
entation of works, Congress did not indicate that this was a basis for
the CTEA; moreover, the desire for control would not be a sufficient
constitutional basis.
C. Longer Commercial Lives of Works
One consistently offered reason that the current terms were in-
sufficient, and one emphasized in the 1996 Senate Report, was that
modem communications technologies generally extended the com-
mercial lives of works.99 For this reason the copyright is now expir-
ing for many works that are still being performed and are still gener-
ating royalties. 00 No witness offered a basis for distinguishing a
twenty-year extension, as proposed by the CTEA, and a perpetual
copyright for works that retain commercial value. No witness ex-
plained how maintaining copyright in existing works for more of
their now-longer commercial lives comported with the constitutional
mandate to "promote the Progress of Science." Nor did anyone at-
tempt to explain how a term based on an assumed longer commercial
life comports with the constitutional mandate that copyright terms be
OpposingCopyrightExtension/commentary/austen-wsj.html (summarizing and
commenting on Stevens' article).
97. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n of
N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
98. See e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 304(a), (b) (applying the ninety-five-year term to
"any copyright").
99. 1996 Senate Report, supra note 27, at 12.
100. See id. at 12-14.
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for "limited Times." The epic poetry of Homer, the Bible, and the
works of Shakespeare would all qualify for copyright under this ra-
tionale.
D. Value of the Public Domain
Although the 1996 Senate Report did not make the assertion,
many pro-CTEA witnesses testified that term extension would be es-
sentially costless to the American public. 10 ' By means of anecdotal
example, they argued that works in the public domain sold for prices
that were equal to or even greater than the prices for works still un-
der copyright. These claims were rarely challenged at the hear-
ings. 10 Nevertheless, one would have to reject basic microeconomic
theory to conclude that, in a competitive economy, reducing the cost
of one input to a product while keeping everything else constant
would not cause prices to fall. Prices in a competitive economy
should fall to marginal cost. 0 3 The absence of copyright eliminates
monopoly pricing, °4 and marginal cost decreases when a royalty no
101. Id. at25,27.
102. But see 1995 House Hearings, supra note 25, at 417 (testimony of Den-
nis S. Karjala, stating that he did not accept claims that the costs were de
minimis and asking for a study); Opposition Statement, supra note 31, at 3, 7
(arguing that longer terms are economically inefficient and that public costs
outweigh public benefits).
103. See Brief of George A. Akerlof et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Pe-
titioners at 10-12, Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618 [hereinafter Economists
Brief].
104. This is an element that has received insufficient consideration in the lit-
erature concerning term extension. In the nineteenth century, before the U.S.
recognized copyrights on works from other countries, competition among pub-
lishers of works by famous foreign authors, especially those from Britain, re-
duced prices far below those for protected works by U.S. authors. This was a
primary reason U.S. authors got on the "international copyright" bandwagon.
See SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, COPYRIGHTS AND COPYWRONGS 50-62 (2001).
For example, books by an emerging U.S. author would cost at least $0.50 per
copy, while unprotected versions of Sir Walter Scott's Ivanhoe were available
for $0.10-0.15. See id. at 59. This difference by a factor of three may be ex-
plained partially by differences in production quality, but it cannot be ex-
plained by a royalty requirement alone. And, if low production quality is the
explanation for the price differential, it means that the purchasing public pre-
ferred that tradeoff between price and quality. Otherwise, some publishers
would have responded with higher-production-quality versions. In fact, com-
petition resulted in giving American readers "their choice of dozens of editions
of their favorite British authors in a wide variety of prices and quality." Id. at
53.
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longer has to be paid.10 5 The fundamental premise of copyright as an
incentive is that it allows the extraction of monopoly profits during
its term. Indeed, the pro-CTEA witnesses were often desperate to
keep their royalty streams flowing. 106 Somebody is obviously paying
these royalties, and because American citizens and companies are the
major users of U.S. works,'0 7 it is clear that Americans are paying
them. 108 Moreover, the most important cost to the public results
The copyright allows pricing above marginal cost. To be sure, while
books are not entirely fungible, at some price many people will simply buy a
different book, or no book at all, and this limits the degree to which prices can
rise above marginal cost. There is little reason, however, to think that the en-
tire increase is due to a royalty payment to the author. Most important, the fig-
ures from the nineteenth century clearly show that the absence of copyright did
very definitely result in a wide variety of works available to the American pub-
lic at lower prices. See id. Thus, the claim that public domain status does not
benefit the consumer is utterly without merit.
105. Pro-CTEA witnesses used the technique of holding up one public do-
main and one protected book or CD, of unstated production quality or length,
to show that public-domain status did not reduce prices for consumers. See
supra note 83. In contrast, Tim Phillips has conducted a much more careful
survey of public domain songbooks, in which he attempts to control at least for
quantity. Tim Phillips, Survey on the Relative Costs of Copyright-Protected
and Public Domain Songs, available at
http://www.law.asu.edu/HomePages/Karjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/
publicdomain/PhillipsSongSurvey.html. He found that the average cost per
song was from 20-33% lower for public domain songs than for protected
songs. See id.; see also Letter from Randolph P. Luck, President of Luck's
Music Library, to Senator Spencer Abraham (June 28, 1996) available at
http://www.law.asu.edu/HomePages/Karjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/
letters/Luck'sMusic0l.html (showing a dramatic drop in the cost of classical
sheet music when works enter the public domain). To compare a recent John
Grisham novel, which may sell millions of copies, to a Tolstoy work in the
public domain, which may sell copies measured in the thousands, is to com-
pare apples and oranges. Where the market is thin, higher prices may be nec-
essary just to cover production costs, so prices are higher notwithstanding
competition and the absence of royalties. See 1995 Senate Hearing, supra note
24, at 82 (statement of Dennis S. Karjala); Opposition Statement, supra note
31, at I1.
106. See supra note 53 (discussing the claimed losses of copyright revenues
to heirs of copyright-protected materials).
107. Even the pro-CTEA Register of Copyrights testified that the U.S. was
the biggest market for U.S. works, making the CTEA difficult to justify on
economic grounds. See 1995 Senate Hearing, supra note 24, at 22 (testimony
of Marybeth Peters).
108. Businesses are every bit as much "consumers" as individuals and are
equally entitled to the benefits that flow from the free availability of works that
226
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from new derivative works that are not created and performances that
do not take place because the new author or performer cannot obtain
permission from whoever owns the copyright fifty years after the
original author's death. The claims that the public domain does not
benefit the public are therefore not merely implausible; they are sim-
ply false. Surely this is the main reason the 1996 Senate Report does
not expressly rely on them. Yet, it is difficult to escape the conclu-
sion that Congress was enticed by the notion that it could supply a
benefit to major campaign contributors purportedly without cost to
the public.
E. Harmonization with the European Union and the Balance of
Trade
Congress heard conclusory evidence that international "har-
monization" of copyright law was important to maintaining and de-
veloping U.S. preeminence in copyright-protected works. 09 No one
testified how harmonization of copyright terms (as opposed to sim-
ply lengthening them as the CTEA did) would provide these claimed
trade advantages. Nor did anyone testify how the CTEA achieved
harmonization of copyright terms for works (except for post-1977
works by individuals) or seek to extend only the post-1977 or the
post-CTEA terms. The testimony, including statements from some
pro-CTEA witnesses, demonstrated that the CTEA did not, in fact,
achieve harmonization."l 0 Even if harmonization is a permissible
goal of copyright legislation where it promotes the progress of sci-
ence, Congress had no credible evidence before it to show (1) that
the CTEA as proposed would achieve harmonization for anything
but individually authored post-1977 works or (2) that the harmoniza-
tion achieved would in fact promote the progress of science. Con-
gress received much evidence to the contrary. Therefore, any test
enter the public domain. To the extent the royalties are paid by a commercial
enterprise (whether a formal "business" or an individual performer), the ulti-
mate consumer pays indirectly through higher prices necessarily charged by
the direct user due to its higher costs. Of course, U.S. consumers will also
have to keep paying for whatever uses they make of foreign works that remain
protected during the extended period.
109. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 45-55 and accompanying text.
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beyond rubber stamp rational basis must lead to overturning the stat-
ute to the extent its adoption rests on this ground.
The other aspect of the "harmonization" argument is that the ex-
tended term, while failing to harmonize with the EU (let alone most
of the rest of the world), would improve our international trade bal-
ance by sending money from Europe to U.S. copyright owners who
would otherwise lose European royalties after expiration of the U.S.
seventy-five year term because of the EU's mandated "rule of the
shorter term.""' No one offered evidence of any careful study to
show how much old works contribute to the balance of trade or
whether that contribution was negative or positive. 112 Nor did any
witness supply any meaningful argument showing how improve-
ments in international trade, even if achieved by the CTEA, would
"promote the Progress of Science" within the meaning of the Intel-
lectual Property Clause.
F. Incentives for New Creativity or Increased Public Access
The foregoing shows that neither fairness to authors, mainte-
nance of authorial control, longer commercial lives of works, an as-
serted lack of value of the public domain, nor harmonization justifies
the congressional action in adopting the CTEA. There remains the
question of incentives. We must consider two types: incentives to
create new works and incentives to preserve, restore, distribute, or
further exploit existing works.
111. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
112. One CTEA proponent suggested that the 1920s and 1930s marked the
beginning of U.S. preeminence in the copyright industries, but he offered no
data to prove the implication that trade from that era was either positive or sig-
nificant in comparison to trade in current works, like movie blockbusters and
Microsoft's computer software. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
Only the copyright industries themselves have the data necessary to answer
questions like how much old works contribute to the balance of trade. Had the
numbers been convincing at any level, we can be sure that testimony would
have been forthcoming. Cf Malla Pollack, The Right to Know?. Delimiting
Database Protection at the Juncture of the Commerce Clause, the Intellectual
Property Clause, and the First Amendment, 17 CARDOZO ARTS &-ENT. L.J.
47, 95-96 (1999) (showing how the database industries blurred the distinction
between "exports" and "foreign sales" in hearings concerning database protec-
tion and concluding that information in their control concerning prices to U.S.
consumers and relative growth of jobs inside and outside the U.S. was likely
not favorable to them.)
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No one testified in favor of prospective copyright term extension
(or even post-1977 extension) alone. No one argued that term exten-
sion for existing works would provide any incentive for the creation
of new works except in the general sense that "stronger copyright
means a greater incentive." There was testimony that the extra in-
come from extension for existing works could be used to subsidize
the creation of new works, but no pro-CTEA witness suggested that
extension for existing works be tied to or conditioned upon using the
money to finance new creativity. Not only would the subsidization
argument justify reviving copyrights in popular works, it would jus-
tify giving those extended or revived copyrights to just about anyone
who plausibly might use the exploitation proceeds to finance new
works, regardless of whether they are "authors." Further, no one
presented evidence that the heirs and assignees of the many valuable
old copyrights whose terms were extended by the CTEA were espe-
cially creative or especially in need of funding. Jack Valenti did not
testify to a dearth of capital in the movie industry, nor did he attempt
to show how much Hollywood income from the nineteen-year exten-
sion effected by the 1976 Act was devoted to new projects that
would not otherwise have been financed. Indeed, to believe that
Hollywood would devote the extension proceeds to projects that
were otherwise economically unviable flies in the face of ordinary
microeconomic principles."13
Given the huge preponderance of pro-CTEA witnesses asked to
testify, we may safely assume that Congress heard all of the constitu-
tionally relevant arguments for retroactive extension. Any independ-
ent review of this record must conclude that Congress could not have
believed that extending the term for existing works would lead to the
creation of new works in anything but a haphazard, and to the public
very costly, way. It is thoroughly implausible that Congress ex-
pected to promote new creativity by protecting the income stream of
a single copyright owner who might or might not invest it in devel-
oping new works. The whole purpose of expiration after a "limited
Time[]" is to harness the creativity of many potential creators who
will take the work farther or promote it in new and different ways.
Nor could such an independent review find that the 105th Congress
113. See Opposition Statement, supra note 31, at 23-24; see also Petitioners
Brief, supra note 91, at 42 (arguing that without a quid pro quo, there is no
change in the incentives to produce).
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had any basis for concluding that prospective term extension would
promote the progress of science. Although one can imagine the theo-
retical possibility that a record carefully measuring the costs and
benefits would support prospective extension, no one supporting the
CTEA sought prospective extension alone.
Finally, then, we are down to the question of whether copyright
term extension for existing works encourages preservation, digitiza-
tion, distribution, or other exploitation of existing works. 14 Testi-
mony suggested that digitizing existing films in the interest of pre-
serving them and making them more accessible involved significant
investment.' 15 On the other hand, testimony also asserted that copy-
right owners would have an incentive to restore and digitize only
those relatively few works retaining economic value, while the
CTEA would subject all restoration and preservation projects to the
transaction costs of copyright, such as locating the owners of orphan
works. 11
6
Moreover, the testimony that a subsisting underlying copyright
is an important incentive for the creation of derivative works makes
little sense, applies equally to all term extensions of whatever length,
and flies in the face of experience. For example, no one explained
why, if creators of derivative works value subsistence of an underly-
ing copyright, creation of derivative work is not undertaken at least
within a few years of the expiration of the existing term, while rights
remain exclusive. In addition, no one indicated why copyright own-
ers would be moved to create derivative works in the period from
seventy-five to ninety-five years after first publication where they
had not done so in the first seventy-five years. The argument thus
applies to any term increase at any time. Its implausibility is further
suggested by the recent spate of high-production quality films and
other works based on the public domain works of Shakespeare,
114. See Brief of Hal Roach Studios & Michael Agee as Amici Curiae Sup-
porting Petitioners at 6-23, Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618 [hereinafter Hal
Roach Brief] (demonstrating how the film preservation rationale is logically
and legally unsound and that the CTEA hurts film preservation, restoration,
and digitization).
115. E.g., 1995 House Hearing at 50 (statement of Jack Valenti). That film
restoration is expensive is not in dispute. See Hal Roach Brief at 12.
116. See Hal Roach Brief, supra note 114, at 13-14.
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Hardy, Austen, Hugo, and many others. "17 Perhaps the best example
is that of Disney itself. Disney was one of the strongest lobbyists for
the CTEA.11 8 Yet many of Disney's films have been based on public
domain works. 1
9
Whether the goal is to encourage digitization, preservation, or
new exploitation, Congress could have believed that-in the case of
some old films-an extended term might lead to the desired goal.
Even this was strongly contested, however, and no pro-CTEA wit-
ness offered any plausible argument, let alone any factual support,
that term extension would supply an incentive for the preservation or
digitization of other types of works. Nor did any such witness ex-
plain how term extension would encourage the preservation of works
that lack economic value but have immense historic, research, or
scholarly value. In fact, there was affirmative evidence that adoption
of the CTEA would harm such projects.
Therefore, the evidence presented to Congress provided no basis
for extending the copyright term for all works just because old films
are deteriorating and are expensive to restore. Nor was there any
evidentiary basis for believing that a work that was not fully ex-
ploited by its copyright owner in the first seventy-five years of copy-
right protection would be newly exploited during an additional
117. See Mary B.W. Tabor, Vanishing rights mean open book season on
jazz-age classics, THE EDMONTON JOURNAL, June 9, 1995, reprinted in THE
VANCOUVER SUN, Aug. 23, 1995 under the title Publishers' loss is readers'
gain as classics go public. Ms. Tabor states that publishing companies were
"scrambling to publish.., newly available titles" such as WOMEN IN LOVE by
D.H. Lawrence, THIS SIDE OF PARADISE by F. Scott Fitzgerald, and THE AGE
OF INNOCENCE by Edith Wharton, as such classic works entered the public
domain. Id. The entrance into the public domain of Frances Hodgson Bur-
nett's THE SECRET GARDEN has also spawned a huge outpouring of new and
creative derivative works. See Derivative Works Based on Frances Hodgson
Burnett's Classic The Secret Garden (1911), at
http://www.law.asu.edu/HomePages/Karjala/OpposingCopyrightExtensionl
publicdomain/SecretGardenDWs.html (last visited Aug. 11, 2002) (providing a
short list).
118. See infra note 121.
119. E.g., MULAN (1998); THE HUNCHBACK OF NOTRE DAME (1996);
POCAHONTAS (1995); BEAUTY AND THE BEAST (1991); THE LITTLE MERMAID
(1989); THE JUNGLE BOOK (1967); KIDNAPPED (1960); SLEEPING BEAUTY
(1959); THE LEGEND OF SLEEPY HOLLOW (1958); PAUL BUNYON (1958);
JOHNNY APPLESEED (1955); 20,000 LEAGUES UNDER THE SEA (1954); ALICE
IN WONDERLAND (1951); CINDERELLA (1950); PINOCCHIO (1940); SNOW
WHITE AND THE SEVEN DWARFS (1937).
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twenty-year period. (Moreover, this argument works for any exten-
sion at any time.) 120 An independent review of the evidence should
leave one skeptical that preservation goals motivated Congress to en-
act the CTEA. To the contrary, Congress steadfastly refused to con-
sider proposals that were more carefully tailored to serve these goals
without inflicting nearly as much damage on the public domain.
IV. CONGRESS'S REAL MOTIVES
In addition to the formal evidence Congress received during the
various hearings on copyright term extension, the popular press sup-
plied a number of anecdotal reports on lobbying by major beneficiar-
ies of the CTEA. In particular, the press reported campaign contri-
butions from CTEA beneficiaries to members of the Senate Judiciary
Committee and House Judiciary Subcommittee on Courts and Intel-
lectual Property. 12 1 Of course, there is nothing inherently wrong in
120. It is also an argument for giving the extended rights to persons in the
best position to restore or exploit the work rather than to the constitutionally
mandated authors or inventors. There is little reason to think that the heirs or
assignees of original creators are particularly qualified to fulfill the goals of
restoration or digitalization of old works.
121. See, e.g., Alan K. Ota, Disney in Washington: The Mouse That Roars,
56 CQ WEEKLY 2167 (1998) (discussing the visit of Disney's Michael Eisner
to Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott urging passage of the CTEA, Disney's
lobbying expenditures of $1.5 million in the past year, Disney's hosting of
Newt Gingrich, then House Majority Leader, at its "educational" institute, and
its $800,000 of campaign contributions in 1997-98, including key members of
the Judiciary Committees), available at
http://www.law.asu.edu/HomePages/Karjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/
constitutionality/CQW-DisneyLobbying8-8-98.html; Daren Fonda, Copy-
right's Crusader, BOSTON GLOBE MAG., Aug. 29, 1999 (reporting political
contributions from media companies, especially Disney, to congressional lead-
ers and members of the Judiciary Committees, such as Howard Coble, Patrick
Leahy, Orrin Hatch, and Trent Lott), available at
http://www.law.asu.edu/HomePages/Karjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/
commentary/Fonda8-29-99.html; Brigid McMenamin, Mickey's Mine!,
FORBES MAG., Aug. 23, 1999, at 43 ("No wonder Walt Disney, whose most
valuable characters were set to lapse into the public domain, devoted millions
to lobbying and campaign contributions as Congress weighed the idea [of the
CTEA]. So did Time Warner."), available at http://www.law.asu.edu/
Home-
Pages/Karjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/commentary/Mcmenamin8-23-99.
html; John Solomon, Rhapsody in Green, BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 3, 1999, at E02
(reporting on Disney's contribution to Trent Lott and to the National Republi-
can Senatorial Committee after Michael Eisner's lobbying in favor of the
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contributing to political candidates or in trying to convince our repre-
sentatives in Washington that a particular law would be good policy.
No evidence of which I am aware indicates that CTEA beneficiaries
made campaign contributions on a quid pro quo basis or that contri-
butions were accepted in any way other than as support from people
or groups who agreed with the legislator's politics. Contributors do,
however, often get the ears of busy members of Congress. When
Congress passes legislation that directly benefits influential lobbyists
and campaign contributors, without discussion of its costs to the gen-
eral public, we must be suspicious that Congress simply has not
heard the public's side of the story.
It is easy to see why this happened in the case of the CTEA.
The benefits of this legislation are concentrated on a relatively small
number of individuals and companies who can afford to set aside a
percentage of their potential benefit for lobbying. The costs of copy-
right term extension, on the other hand, are diffuse. These costs are
paid, in small amounts, by just about every American, and they are
paid in such a way that the extra cost to Americans is not directly
identified with the legislation that creates the cost. Some of the
heaviest costs of term extension-the loss of works not created or
not performed because of the transaction costs of copyright licens-
ing-may not be felt by individual members of the public. Few con-
sumers can know what works have not been created or performed
due to copyright licensing difficulties.
22
CTEA), available at http://www.law.asu.edu/HomePages/Karjala/
OpposingCopyrightExtension/commentary/Solomon 1 -3-99.html; Associated
Press, Disney Lobbying for Copyright Extension No Mickey Mouse Effort, CHm.
TRIB., Oct. 17, 1998 (reporting on Disney's lobbying and contributions, par-
ticularly to CTEA sponsors), available at
http://www.law.asu.edu/HomePages/Karjala/OpposingCopyrightExtension/
commentary/ChiTrib10-17-98.html; Bill McAllister, Mouse Droppings,
WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 1998, at A21 (reporting on Disney lobbying efforts and
Eisner's meeting with Trent Lott).
122. Brief of Jack M. Balkin et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of the Peti-
tioners at 20, Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618 [hereinafter Constitutional Law
Professors Brief] ("Although the benefits of copyright extensions to discrete
industries are palpable and concrete, the costs of such extensions to future us-
ers are diffuse and intangible").
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This problem is not new to the law. Commentators have written
generally on public choice theory and legislative capture.123 Whether
the problem should be addressed through the political process or
whether the courts should intervene is a question quite separate from
recognizing that it is a problem. Once we establish that we have a
problem with the political process, the discussion can focus on the
role, if any, courts should play in resolving the problem.
No independent review of the record can leave any doubt as to
why the CTEA was adopted. The CTEA does not harmonize U.S.
terms with those of the EU, whose copyright term extension was said
to necessitate our own. There was no evidence how harmonization
of copyright terms would contribute favorably to our international
trade balance. Congress did not determine how much of the cost of
term extension would be borne by U.S. citizens and how much
would be borne by Europeans. Congress did not even inquire
whether the net effect of copyright term extension would be positive
for the U.S., or what difference it would make in our overall trade in
copyright-protected works (the vast bulk of which consists of current
works, not the old works that are the beneficiaries of retroactive term
extension). Needless to say, Congress made no effort to determine
the costs to the U.S. public, in either royalties paid during the exten-
sion period or in works not created, performed, or restored due to
transaction costs, to ascertain whether those costs did not exceed the
purported benefits of "harmonization."
While some theoretical basis exists for finding that prospective
term extension might "promote the Progress of Science," the failure
of any CTEA proponent or any member of the Judiciary Committees
to recommend limiting the CTEA to works created after its adoption
shows that prospective extension was only a smokescreen. Congress
may have had a traditional rational basis for concluding that copy-
right term extension might encourage the restoration of some old
movies (notwithstanding the more substantial conflicting evidence
that more films were likely to be preserved if they were allowed to
123. E.g., Sterk, supra note 44, at 1244-46; MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF
COLLECTIVE ACTION 125-28 (1971) (large-group organization is ineffective
where the benefits are collective because of free riding). See generally DANIEL
A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL
INTRODUCTION (1991) (analyzing interest groups and the political process in
the context of public choice theory).
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enter the public domain). Nevertheless, film restoration cannot be
accepted as the basis for extending the copyright terms on hundreds
of thousands of works for which there is no pressing need for restora-
tion or works that would not in any event be restored by economi-
cally motivated actors because the works lack economic value. If
Congress were interested in encouraging the restoration and preser-
vation of our film heritage, Congress had many narrower possibilities
from which it could have chosen.
Thus, the only conclusion possible from the record before Con-
gress is that Congress gave in to the demands of the heirs and assign-
ees of old copyrights that still had economic value but were about to
enter the public domain. The vast bulk of the pro-CTEA testimony
asserted that the current terms did not supply "fair" or "adequate"
protection for authors and their heirs (their corporate assignees were
much less often mentioned), because commercial lives of works have
grown longer and because extension would not cost the public any-
thing anyway. 124 That extension would not cost the public anything
is demonstrably false. Whether commercial lives of works today are
generally longer than they were in the past is debatable. The only
part of the assertion that is unassailable is that owners of old copy-
rights desperately wanted copyright term extension to extend their
royalty streams--calling the term unfairly or inadequately short at a
mere seventy-five years and multimillions of dollars in total royal-
ties.
Affirming that there is a problem leads to two questions: first,
does Congress have the constitutional power under the Intellectual
Property Clause to extend existing copyright terms for the purpose of
effecting a wealth transfer from the general public to the owners of
copyrights in old works that they did not create? Second, if this ac-
tion is not authorized by the Intellectual Property Clause, should the
courts intervene to determine whether this action was indeed aimed
at an impermissible wealth transfer and by what standard should the
courts determine whether Congress acted impermissibly?
124. See supra notes 80-86 and accompanying text.
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V. JUDICIAL REVIEW oF THE CTEA
A. What Does the Intellectual Property Clause Empower?
The petitioners and numerous amici in Eldred have argued that
the Intellectual Property Clause does not authorize Congress to ex-
tend the terms for existing works for any of the reasons advanced by
the proponents of the CTEA. 125 The argument is that a wealth trans-
fer from the public to owners of old copyrights does not "promote
the Progress of Science."'126 Moreover, because Congress could (and
has) continued to extend the term seriatim, any such extension can-
not be considered to be for a "limited Time[].', 127 "Harmonization"
with Europe's natural-rights-based copyright systems does not "pro-
mote the Progress of Science,"'1 28 and maintenance of the U.S. eco-
nomic position in the international marketplace for information
works is not the kind of "progress" envisioned by the constitutional
purpose.129 The Clause requires incentives for new creativity, and
the CTEA fails to supply such incentives.1 30  Moreover, Congress
may not rely on the Commerce Clause to make an end-run around an
explicit limitation in a separate express power.' 31 These arguments,
in my opinion, are valid and compelling. I do not repeat them here in
order to focus on the question of the scope ofjudicial review.
125. See Petitioners Brief, supra note 91, at 11-33; Intellectual Property Pro-
fessors Brief, supra note 91, at 15-21; Brief of Amici Curiae National Writers
Union et al. in Support of Petitioners at 15-29, Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618
[hereinafter National Writers Brief].
126. See Intellectual Property Professors Brief, supra note 91, at 21; Na-
tional Writers Brief, supra note 125, at 20-2 1.
127. See Petitioners Brief, supra note 91, at 17-19.
128. Moreover, this rationale is illusory. See Brief Amici Curiae of The
American Association of Law Libraries et al. in Support of Petitioners at 28-
29, Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618 [hereinafter Libraries Brief].
129. See National Writers Brief, supra note 125, at 18-19.
130. See Petitioners Brief, supra note 91, at 15-16, 19-23; Intellectual Prop-
erty Professors Brief, supra note 91, at 15-16; National Writers Brief, supra
note 125, at 22-29.
131. See Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 468-71
(1982) (holding that Congress does not have power to enact nonuniform bank-
ruptcy laws under the Commerce Clause, because that would eradicate from
the Constitution the uniformity limitation contained in the Bankruptcy Clause).
Similarly, Congress does not have power under the Commerce Clause to afford
exclusive rights to authors or inventors for more than "limited Times" or where
such rights do not "promote the Progress of Science." Id.
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Before turning to that, however, I would make one additional
argument against congressional power to enact retroactive term ex-
tension that has not yet been made by petitioners or amici. The Su-
preme Court has unequivocally stated that Congress does not have
the power to remove works from the public domain, because to do so
would not "promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts."' 132 We
may leave to the side the question of whether the Court intended this
to apply absolutely or whether there might be some specific removals
from the public domain that Congress could properly find would
promote the progress of science. 133 If the Constitution does not pro-
hibit reviving expired copyrights generally, the constitutional re-
quirement that exclusive intellectual property rights be granted only
for "limited Times" becomes a meaningless formality.'3  Moreover,
it would mean that copyrights could be given to people other than the
132. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966) ("Congress may not
authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowl-
edge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already
available.").
133. That issue is raised in Golan v. Ashcroft, Civ. Act. No. 01-B-1854 (D.
Colo. filed Sept. 19, 2001) available at
http://www.law.stanford.edu/library/special/ashcroft-0 1-B-1 854.pdf. Golan
challenges the revival of copyrights in works whose country of origin is other
than the U.S., where those works entered the public domain due to failure to
follow a formal requirement of prior U.S. copyright law, such as publishing
with notice or filing for renewal in the twenty-eighth year of the initial term.
This revival was effected in the Uruguay Round Agreements Act, purportedly
to bring the U.S. into compliance with international treaty obligations. Whether
such treaty obligations, if they exist, are sufficient to authorize recognizing a
new copyright in a public domain work is well beyond the scope of the retroac-
tive extension issue in Eldred. Arguably, compliance with the treaties brings
advantages to copyright owners that increase authorial incentives to create
works, so revivals permitting our continued participation in the treaties con-
ceivably will "promote the Progress of Science." Under the theory of judicial
review presented in this Article, courts should scrutinize such action carefully
to be convinced that Congress did have plausible grounds for believing that its
action would promote the progress of science and is not a smokescreen for
evading the "limited Times" requirement. No such treaty obligations are in-
volved in Eldred. The government has recommended a stay in Golan pending
the Supreme Court's decision in Eldred. Defendant's Notice of Grant of Cer-
tiorari in Eldred v. Ashcroft, Golan, No. 01-B-1854 available at
http://www.law.stanford.edu/library/special/Eldred.cert.notice.pdf.
134. The D.C. Circuit in Eldred recognized that John Deere "would indeed
preclude Congress from authorizing.., a copyright to a work already in the
public domain." Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 377 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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"Authors" who are specified in the Constitution, because in most
cases the original author will be long dead by the time a copyright is
considered for revival.
135
On what basis, if any, does the constitutional power distinguish
between works already in the public domain and works that are still
protected but near the end of their original term? Specifically, the
CTEA extended the term of protection for 1923 works by twenty
years, from the end of 1998 to the end of 2018. Yet works from
1922, which were already in the public domain in 1998, remained
there. Nothing, besides the difference of one year in initial publica-
tion date, distinguishes these two types of works. Many U.S. works
from 1922 would be protected by Europe's life-plus-70-year system,
so the "harmonization" argument applies to 1922 works as well as it
does to 1923 works. No one attempted to show that 1923 works con-
tribute substantially more to our balance of trade than 1922 works
would were they still protected.136 No one can say that the heirs of
1922 authors are less needy or less likely to exploit, restore, or pre-
serve works from that year than heirs of 1923 authors. If the descen-
dants of 1923 authors have not received a "fair" or "adequate" return
from exploitation of their works, the same must be said for the de-
scendants of 1922 authors.
Of course, it is true that we are dealing with a continuum and
that a line must be drawn if copyright terms are not to be perpetual.
That says nothing, however, about where the line should be drawn.
Without guidance from the Constitution, drawing that line is arbi-
trary. With the CTEA, Congress chose to draw the line at 1922,
which had the effect of continuing as-yet-unexpired copyrights but
not of reviving expired copyrights. But what is it in the Constitution
that compelled Congress to draw that line?
I believe the answer is "nothing." That is, nothing in constitu-
tional power distinguishes between the years 1922 and 1923 on the
135. This is necessarily the case for any "life plus" term. It is not necessarily
the case for the seventy-five-year term established for 1909 Act works whose
copyrights were timely renewed. Copyrights on some of Irving Berlin's early
songs expired while the composer was still alive. See 1995 House Hearings,
supra note 25, at 272 (statement of Mary Ellin Barrett).
136. The closest anyone came to this was Commissioner of Patents and
Trademarks Bruce A. Lehman, who noted generally that the era of the 1920s
and 1930s marked the beginning of U.S. preeminence in copyright. See supra
notes 54-55 and accompanying text.
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question of copyright term. The CTEA gave the benefit of an ex-
tended term to whoever owned a 1923 copyright at the time of the
Act. 137 Congress could have drafted legislation that granted copy-
rights in 1922 works to whoever owned them on December 31, 1997.
In either case, the beneficiaries would rarely have been the authors.
Therefore, if 1923 copyrights pass muster under the "promote the
Progress of Science" and "limited Times" requirements of the Intel-
lectual Property Clause, that must equally be true for 1922 copy-
rights. The Constitution simply does not distinguish between these
two years.
Yet, to say that Congress has power to revive expired copyrights
without requiring a convincing case that revival would "promote the
Progress of Science" would effectively eradicate that basic purpose
of the congressional power from the Constitution. It would also
emasculate the "limited Times" restriction on congressional power as
well as the requirement that the exclusive rights of copyright be se-
cured to "Authors." We may therefore conclude that the Constitution
prohibits extending 1923 copyrights to the same extent it prohibits
reviving 1922 copyrights. If revival of copyrights after their term
has expired is unconstitutional as violative of the "limited Times" re-
striction, so too is retroactive term extension. If revived copyrights
may only be secured in "authors," so too must retroactive extensions
of existing copyrights. If revival of expired copyrights is permissible
only upon a showing that to do so would promote the progress of
science, retroactive term extension must be subject to the same strict
scrutiny.
B. The Standard of Judicial Review
Congress, we must assume, has determined that the CTEA was
enacted within its constitutional powers. The question is how much
deference, if any, the Court should pay to this congressional
determination. Petitioners and amici have cited extensive
137. There is one minor exception: any prior transfer or license already be-
yond its first termination period and as to which no termination right had been
exercised is subject to termination by the statutory heirs of the original author
with respect to the twenty years added to the term by the CTEA. See 17
U.S.C. § 304(d).
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authority, 138 beginning with Marbury v. Madison,139 that the Su-
preme Court is the ultimate arbiter of the meaning of the Constitu-
tion. 140 Even though the Court was deeply split in Lopez 14 1 and Mor-
rison,142 its two recent Commerce Clause cases, both the majority
and the dissenters agreed that congressional power under that clause
is limited by the Court's interpretation of the term "commerce."
1 43
Instead, the division involved whether the Court could meaningfully
set "judicially enforceable outer limits"'144 or whether, as a practical
matter, judicial establishment of categorical limits was simply no
longer possible, 145 especially after sixty years of allowing Congress
to legislate in any area where it saw a substantial effect on interstate
commerce. 146 Consequently, under either view, the Court is constitu-
tionally authorized, and indeed compelled, to determine the meaning
of "limited Times" and "promote the Progress of Science" in the In-
tellectual Property Clause.
The Commerce Clause has caused problems for the Court be-
cause the only substantive limitation it contains is the phrase "Com-
merce ... among the several States."' 147 The opinions on both sides
in Lopez and Morrison detail the many difficulties the Court has
faced in interpreting this phrase as the country underwent "two cen-
turies of scientific, technological, commercial, and environmental
138. Petitioners Brief, supra note 91, at 11-14; Brief of Malla Pollack,
Amicus Curiae, Supporting Petitioners at 8-13, Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618
[hereinafter Pollack Brief].
139. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
140. See, e.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516 (1997) (affirming
"judicial authority to determine constitutionality of laws"); Ry. Labor Execu-
tives' Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 467-69 (1982) (determining that con-
gressional action purportedly under the Commerce Clause was in fact an exer-
cise of power under the Bankruptcy Clause and further determining the nature
of the uniformity required by the Bankruptcy Clause).
141. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
142. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
143. See supra note 14 and accompanying text.
144. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 610.
145. See id. at 660 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
146. See id. at 646-47 n.14 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("[T]o suppose that enu-
merated powers must have limits is sensible; to maintain that there exist judi-
cially identifiable areas of state regulation immune to the plenary congres-
sional commerce power even though falling within the limits defined by the
substantial effects test is to deny our constitutional history.").
147. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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change."' 48 Part of the difficulty was jurisprudential. For over 100
years the Court created categories of things that either were or were
not "commerce."' 149 That was followed by approximately sixty years
in which the Court defined "commerce" broadly as essentially any
activity that substantially affected commerce. Recently, a majority
of the Court is again going in the direction of categorical restrictions
in the service of "judicially enforceable outer limits." 150 In other
words, the dissenters in these Commerce Clause cases had some
sixty years of recent precedent saying essentially that "politics, not
judicial review, should mediate between state and national inter-
ests"'15' as the need grew for a larger federal role in the increasingly
national economy. The dissenters did not deny that the Court is the
ultimate interpreter of the meaning of "commerce" in the Commerce
Clause. 5 2 Rather the dissenters argued that adhering to the sixty
years of pre-Lopez precedent, which allowed Congress nearly free
reign in regulating the economy through "rational basis" review of
statutes enacted under the commerce power, was the only approach
that made practical sense.15 3 Perhaps most important, the dissenters
in these Commerce Clause cases could forcefully argue that the in-
terests of the states were fully and adequately represented in the na-
tional legislative process.1
5 4
148. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 660 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
149. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549.
150. Id. at 566.
151. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 647 (Souter, J., dissenting).
152. See id. at 651 n.19 (Souter, J., dissenting).
153. See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
154. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 598, 660-61 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing
that Congress is institutionally motivated to strike an appropriate federal/state
balance because its members represent state and local district interests). Both
Justice Breyer and Justice Souter, dissenting in Morrison, relied heavily on
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 551-52 (1985) (ar-
guing that the constitutional Framers relied on the structure of the federal gov-
ernment itself to protect the interests of the states). The reasoning of Garcia is
fully applicable to term extension legislation, once one adjusts for the crucial
distinctions between the Commerce Clause and the Intellectual Property
Clause.
The fundamental constitutional value in Commerce Clause cases is feder-
alism. The Lopez and Morrison majorities would protect federalism values by
a nonstructural approach categorically excluding certain "noncommercial" ac-
tivities from federal regulation. The same approach to the Intellectual Property
Clause leads to the heightened review argued for herein. The majority in Gar-
cia and the dissenters in Lopez and Morrison would intervene in federal
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The Intellectual Property Clause is different in nearly all of these
respects from the Commerce Clause. 55 First, it has more express
limitations, and the limitations are more concrete. Congress may af-
ford to "Authors" exclusive rights to their "Writings" but only for
"limited Times" and only to "promote the Progress of Science." Sec-
ond, and even more important, these limitations on the power to
grant copyrights are not something the drafters of the Constitution
intended to leave to politics. This Clause does not raise federalism
questions.' 56 The limitations on federal power were included in the
Intellectual Property Clause to ensure that exclusive intellectual
property rights were recognized only in return for original creative
works and that rent-seeking activity by special interests would not
result in monopolies impeding advances in and dissemination of
knowledge rather than "promot[ing] the Progress of Science.',
157
Commerce Clause regulation only "to compensate for possible failings in the
national political process." Id. at 554. In each of these cases there was a
strong argument that the political process was working successfully and that
judicial deference was therefore appropriate. In contrast, the goals of the Intel-
lectual Property Clause are to limit the monopolies afforded to the creators of
original and socially desirable intellectual works to those that "promote the
Progress of Science" and to prevent economically wasteful rent-seeking activ-
ity by those persons owning the monopoly privileges. See infra note 157 and
accompanying text. The argument that the political process was working suc-
cessfully is not only unavailable with respect to the CTEA; the political proc-
ess was actually distorted precisely in the manner against which the limitations
of the Intellectual Property Clause were designed to protect. Compensation for
this failing in the political process through judicial intervention is thus impera-
tive (and all the more so because of the First Amendment interests involved).
This is an example of a "representation-reinforcing" structural approach to ju-
dicial review, which has been recognized by the Court in other contexts as
well. See Coenen, supra note 22, at 1689-98.
155. The Supreme Court has not yet formulated a standard ofjudicial review
for the Intellectual Property Clause. See Pollack Brief, supra note 138 at 2.
Professor Pollack also distinguishes the largely unconstrained commerce
power with the tightly worded purpose, time, and means constraints of the In-
tellectual Property Clause. See id. at 7-8; see also Malla Pollack, Dealing with
Old Father William, or Moving from Constitutional Text to Constitutional
Doctrine: Progress Clause Review of the Copyright Term Extension Act, 36
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 337, 369-70 (2002) [hereinafter Pollack, Dealing with Old
Father William].
156. Congress has preempted state authority to afford copyright-equivalent
rights in works constituting copyright subject matter. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (a).
157. Petitioners Brief, supra note 91, at 23-28 (pointing out that if "limited
Times" is not interpreted to prevent extension of existing copyright terms,
copyright owners have a perpetual incentive to lobby for ever longer
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Moreover, recognizing the dangers inherent in any monopoly right,
the constitutional drafters sought to insure that even a justifiable mo-
nopoly in intellectual creations would be for a "limited Time[]" so
that such creations would become part of the common pool for later
creative authors to use as building blocks.
15 8
The general problems resulting from government-supported mo-
nopolies and the inefficiency of rewarding rent-seeking activity were
thus well known to the Framers' of the Constitution. The specific
copyrights, which is both economically unproductive activity that results in no
new creativity-indeed, it inhibits new creativity-and an illegitimate wealth
transfer); Brief Amici Curiae of Tyler T. Ochoa et al. at 17, Eldred v. Ashcroft,
No. 01-618 [hereinafter Historians Brief] ("The stipulation that patent and
copyright protection be granted only for 'limited Times,' only to 'authors' and
'inventors,' and only 'To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,'
appears to have been aimed at preventing the kinds of abuses that had
prompted the Statute of Monopolies 150 years earlier."); Pollack Brief, supra
note 138, at 22 (clause drafted to curtail hidden subsidies used as a government
pay-off tool). Professor Pollack characterizes indirect payments to special in-
terests in exchange for their support as a "free lunch" that disturbs markets and
results in failures of public oversight of government expenditures. She traces
the practice back to Norman England and the Tudor practice of "purveyance."
See Malla Pollack, Purveyance and Power, or Over-Priced Free Lunch: The
Intellectual Property Clause as an Ally of the Takings Clause in the Public's
Control of Government, 30 Sw. U. L. REv. 1, 20-39 (2000). Even in the
Commerce Clause context, the Court has distinguished between constitution-
ally valid direct local subsidies and constitutionally invalid taxes that discrimi-
nate in favor of local industry. See Dan T. Coenen, Business Subsidies and the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 107 YALE L.J. 965, 972-78 (1998). Among other
reasons, subsidies involve characteristics of visibility, intelligibility,
self-limitation, and impermanence, thus posing less of a threat to dormant
Commerce Clause values than do discriminatory tax breaks. See id. at 1002;
see also Paul J. Heald & Suzanna Sherry, Implied Limits on the Legislative
Power: The Intellectual Property Clause as an Absolute Constraint on Con-
gress, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 1119, 1162-63 (Constitution requires that a suspect
grant [exclusive right] take the form of a quid pro quo: "Congress cannot imi-
tate Queen Elizabeth by granting a monopoly in the making of ale, simply by
prefacing the legislation with a statement that it hopes the monopoly will result
in the production of more varieties of and better ale."); Constitutional Law Pro-
fessors Brief, supra note 122, at 19 ("The CTEA is a quintessential example of
the kind of rent-seeking statute one would expect to result from this structural
distortion [where benefits go to well defined groups today but burdens are
bome in the future by the diffuse public].").
158. Historians Brief, supra note 157 at 20-21 (Intellectual Property Clause
designed to limit the duration and purposes for which exclusive rights could be
granted); Economist Brief, supra note 103, at 14 (pointing out the transaction
costs the CTEA places on new creators).
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limits on congressional power placed in the Intellectual Property
Clause reflect the Framers' attempt to resolve, or at least ameliorate,
these problems. The danger that Congress would fall prey to special-
interest lobbying was precisely the problem these limits were de-
signed to prevent. To make Congress the sole arbiter of constitu-
tional limits would be a classic case of allowing the fox to guard the
chickens. 159 The term "limited Times" was not inserted into the
Clause just so later generations could play word games concerning
whether "forever minus one day" was mathematically finite,' 60 or
even whether a term of one thousand years would qualify as "lim-
ited."'161 It was inserted to insure that the exclusive rights created by
Congress pursuant to this power would afford a monopoly that was
only temporary-one that was justified by the benefit to the commu-
nity from the revelation by authors and inventors of the fruits of their
creative endeavors. 62 The original term of copyright, which was a
maximum of twenty-eight years, provides a good idea of what
159. See Michael H. Davis, Extending Copyright and the Constitution:
"Have I Stayed Too Long?", 52 FLA. L. REV. 989, 993 (2000) (citing JOHN
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST (1980) (stating that judicial review is par-
ticularly important in situations where the very process of legislating has been
impaired)); see also supra note 157.
160. Representative Mary Bono, who replaced the CTEA's namesake in
Congress, stated on the record, "Sonny wanted the term of copyright protection
to last forever. I am informed by staff that such a change would violate the
Constitution. I invite all of you to work with me to strengthen our copyright
laws in all of the ways available to us. As you know, there is also Jack
Valenti's proposal for a term to last forever less one day. Perhaps the Commit-
tee may look at that next Congress." 144 CONG. REC. H9946, 9952 (Oct. 7,
1998).
161. Even the government, in its brief to the D.C. Circuit, conceded that
some fixed-term extensions might violate the "limited Times" requirement.
See Brief for Respondent, supra note 19, at 42 ("It may well be that some term
extensions are so long or so lacking in rational basis that a court could con-
clude that the Congress has in effect created an unlimited term.").
162. See Historians Brief, supra note 157, at 20. This brief quotes a manu-
script by Madison noting that the Constitution permitted granting monopolies
only to authors and inventors:
"as a compensation for a benefit actually gained to the community as a pur-
chase of property which the owner otherwise might withhold from public use.
There can be no just objection to a temporary monopoly in these cases; but it
ought to be temporary, because under that limitation a sufficient recompense
and encouragement may be given."
Id. (citing JAMES MADISON, WRITINGS 756 (Jack N. Rakove ed. 1999)).
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"temporary" meant.' 63 If the courts do not enforce this fundamental
underlying vision of the Intellectual Property Clause, the term "lim-
ited Times" becomes constitutional surplusage, excisable at the will
of Congress. This is a dangerous approach to constitutional interpre-
tation even where there is little suspicion that rent-seeking activity
underlies the congressional motivation. When rent seekers have
been successful, such a "hands off' approach abandons the Court's
constitutional duty.
Similarly, courts must be vigilant in ensuring that Congress does
not afford exclusive rights even for "limited Times" and even to au-
thors or inventors if granting those rights does not "promote the Pro-
gress of Science." The Supreme Court has consistently said that this
constitutional purpose may not be ignored 164 and that the public in-
terest in access to creative works is the primary goal, with reward to
the author or inventor only secondary or incidental. 
165
Congress is better suited than the courts to effect the complex
array of policy tradeoffs that best "promotes the progress of science"
in modem copyright law. Our system, however, is one of checks and
balances. Especially where special interests have managed to con-
vince Congress to pass legislation that is directly contrary to the
163. See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, sec. 1, 1 Stat. 124 (repealed 1802)
(An Act for the encouragement of learning).
164. See Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1966) ("Innovation,
advancement, and things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are inher-
ent requisites in a patent system which by constitutional command must 'pro-
mote the Progress of... useful Arts.' This is the standard expressed in the
Constitution and it may not be ignored."); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft
Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 145-46 (1989) ("The Patent Clause itself reflects a
balance between the need to encourage innovation and the avoidance of mo-
nopolies which stifle competition without any concomitant advance in the
'Progress of Science and useful Arts"'); cf Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 432 (1984) ("The immediate effect of our
copyright law is to secure a fair return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the
ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general
public good.... When technological change has rendered its literal terms am-
biguous, the Copyright Act must be construed in light of this basic purpose.").
165. E.g., Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 526-27 (1994); Feist Pubs.,
Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) ("The primary objective
of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but '[t]o promote the Pro-
gress of Science and useful Arts"'); Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken,
422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975) ("The immediate effect of our copyright law is to se-
cure a fair return for an 'author's' creative labor. But the ultimate aim is, by
this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public good.").
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express constitutional purpose, some independent review of the basis
for the legislation is imperative. 166 Whether the heightened scrutiny
applied by the courts is borrowed from the First Amendment cases,
the "congruence and proportionality" approach of City of Boerne,
167
or a sui generis Intellectual Property Clause requirement of tight fit
with a plausible supporting record,168 the approach hardly matters for
the CTEA. Retroactive term extension cannot survive even a ra-
tional basis analysis unless that term is interpreted to mean "no
analysis at all."' 169 Nothing in the record before Congress, the rea-
sons given by Congress for enacting the CTEA, or common sense
provides any basis for believing that Congress acted other than to af-
ford the owners of old copyrights an indirect subsidy at public ex-
pense. Congress's references to film restoration, international trade,
harmonization with Europe, and incentives for the creation of new
works were simply a smokescreen, as demonstrated by Congress's
failure to inquire honestly and carefully about which of these goals,
if any, were consistent with the constitutional mandate "to promote
the Progress of Science"; Congress's consistent rejection of propos-
als more carefully tailored to achieve the arguably legitimate among
these stated goals (such as prospective extension or conditioning an
extended term on restoration or new creativity); and Congress's
166. See Marci A. Hamilton, Copyright Duration Extension and the Dark
Heart of Copyright, 14 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 655, 659 (1996) ("Al-
though the Court is appropriately loathe to substitute its policy judgments for
those of Congress, it has an obligation to effect the means by which the Consti-
tution divides power within the government and, under the Copyright Clause,
within the society."); see also infra note 170.
167. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 508 (1997) (construing "appro-
priate legislation" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to require "congruence
and proportionality" between injury and statutory remedy); see Petitioners
Brief, supra note 91, at 31-32.
168. See Pollack, Dealing with Old Father William, supra note 157.
169. Even Carolene Products, which established the rational-basis test for
Commerce Clause cases, left room for a narrower scope of its presumption of
constitutionality where a "specific prohibition" of the Constitution was con-
cerned. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
The limitations of the Intellectual Property Clause are "specific prohibitions"
on the scope of the congressional power, in that they expressly exclude the
power to recognize exclusive intellectual property rights that go beyond "lim-
ited Times" or do not "promote the Progress or Science" (or go to people other
than "Authors" or "Inventors" or in respect of something other than their
"Writings" or "Discoveries").
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steadfast refusal to undertake any study of the costs of copyright
term extension to the public and to the public domain.
The Court must make an independent assessment of Congress's
reasons for acting to extend the copyright terms and the plausibility
of the evidence supporting those reasons. That does not mean that the
Court can or should rewrite the Copyright Act in accordance with its
own vision of the constitutional mandate. Congress should deter-
mine which exclusive rights go into the copyright bundle (such as
display rights) as well as the specific limitations on those rights, with
minimal scope for judicial review. 170 Where specific limitations on
Congress's constitutional power are at issue, however, the Court
must be convinced that Congress has seriously considered those con-
stitutional limitations. The narrow question of retroactive term ex-
tension raises such issues in stark relief. The Court should inquire
whether Congress could have honestly believed that extending the
170. The Constitution does not require Congress to adopt any copyright stat-
ute, let alone one giving any particular bundle of rights. It only limits what-
ever exclusive copyright rights Congress does choose to recognize to those go-
ing to "Authors" for their "Writings" and only to the extent that the rights are
for "limited Times" and that they "promote the Progress of Science." Judicial
review is crucial to the success of our constitutional scheme where Congress
presses against the limitations expressly set forth. Judicial review has almost
no role to play, however, in balancing the other interests and social policies re-
flected in the Copyright Act. Register of Copyrights Marybeth Peters was
therefore incorrect when she stated recently that reversal in Eldred could call
into question rights like display rights, which were added to the Copyright Act
in the 1976 legislation and apply to then-existing works as well as works to be
created in the future. Marybeth Peters, Keynote speech at the Spring Meeting,
American Intellectual Property Law Association (Apr. 18-20, 2002), in 63
PAT., TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 551, 552 (Apr. 26, 2002). To ex-
tend the term of an existing work directly raises the question of whether the
bundle of exclusive rights is for a "limited Time[]." Adding a display right to
the bundle, or subtracting from the bundle by expanding exemptions, and ap-
plying them prospectively to existing works, does not impinge on any of the
express limitations of the Intellectual Property Clause (unless they can be
shown not to "promote the Progress of Science"). In particular, the bundle of
exclusive rights, although changed from what it was, still lasts for the same
"limited Time[]" that it had before. Respect for the basic constitutional limita-
tions on congressional power does not require judicial fine-tuning of each of
the complex tradeoffs necessarily made in any copyright statute, and especially
when there is a general overhaul of the type effected by the 1976 Copyright
Act. Of course, even such a complex overhaul should be subject to judicial
scrutiny insofar as it also effected a term increase in addition to the establish-
ment of things like display rights. See supra note 133.
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terms of existing copyrights would "promote the Progress of Sci-
ence," as the Court has defined that phrase, and whether any basis
was in place to prevent perpetual duration by a series of finite-term
extensions. The Court should ask whether the evils against which
the constitutional limitations were devised were part of the impetus
for the congressional action.
On the present record, the answers to these questions are clear,
especially as far as retroactive term extension is concerned. Rent-
seeking, the very evil that led the drafters to the specific limitations
on congressional power in the Intellectual Property Clause, was the
overwhelmingly dominant motivation of the pro-CTEA support-
ers. 171 By treating the "limited Times" restriction as simply a word
game to determine what is "mathematically finite," Congress isolated
this substantive limitation on congressional power both from the
stated purpose of the Clause to "promote the Progress of Science"
and from the goals of the constitutional drafters who very much wor-
ried about government-granted, long-term monopolies. Retroactive
term extension, by definition, cannot serve as a means to "promote
the Progress of Science" as the Court has defined it, that is, as an in-
centive to create the underlying works whose copyrights were ex-
tended. Even expanding the interpretation of "promote the Progress
of Science" to include incentives to restore, digitize, or further ex-
ploit existing works must consider whether the extended exclusive
rights are going to authors for their original writings, 172 and nothing
in the record shows that Congress considered these issues. More-
over, the CTEA is much broader than necessary to achieve any such
ends. There was no evidence that "harmonization" of terms for ex-
isting works would "promote the Progress of Science" by encourag-
ing new creativity. 173 Moreover, Congress could not have believed,
171. See supra Part IV; supra note 157 and accompanying text.
172. See Feist Pubs., Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991);
Petitioners Brief, supra note 91, at 32-33.
173. Professor Pollack has argued that "progress" in the Intellectual Property
Clause originally meant "spread," so that the constitutional mandate is more to
encourage the dissemination of knowledge than the creation of new knowl-
edge. Malla Pollack, What Is Congress Supposed to Promote? Defining
"Progress" in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution, or Intro-
ducing the Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. (forthcoming 2002). The Regis-
ter of Copyrights, Marybeth Peters, stated the belief of the Copyright Office
that "harmonization of the world's copyright laws is imperative if there is to be
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because it is demonstrably false, that retroactive term extension
harmonized U.S. terms with those of the EU.
In addition, "harmonization" cannot in any event justify overrid-
ing the other limits on congressional power under the Intellectual
Property Clause, such as affording the exclusive rights of copyright
only for "limited Times." While improving the United States's posi-
tion in international trade is clearly within the congressional com-
merce power, to treat it as a permissible Intellectual Property Clause
goal would be to eradicate the limitations of that Clause. If Congress
may not legislate directly under the Commerce Clause to circumvent
express limitations in other powers, as the Court has held, 174 neither
may it substitute the phrase "promote commerce" for "promote the
Progress of Science" in the intellectual property power. Retroactive
term extension, therefore, cannot stand under any standard of judicial
review beyond rubber-stamp rational basis. Prospective term exten-
sion, too, cannot stand on this record under such a standard of re-
view, because Congress simply did not consider prospective term ex-
tension alone, although it was urged to do so. 175 There is nothing in
an orderly exploitation of copyrighted works." 1995 Senate Hearing, supra
note 24, at 20. She reasons, however, that in the past copyright owners have
refrained from entering markets where their works were not protected, without
explaining how copyright owners could legally prevent uses in such markets.
She gives no indication how harmonization of terms, especially in the direction
of longer terms, could promote the dissemination of works, "orderly" or oth-
erwise. She even goes on to concede that the CTEA did not harmonize the
U.S. terms with those of the EU. See id. Others testified that extension would
supply an incentive to preserve, restore, distribute, or further exploit works that
were about to enter the public domain. See supra note 76 and accompanying
text. Independent analysis of these claims, however, shows that Congress did
not act with this purpose in mind, because it refused to consider narrower and
more effective means for achieving this result. See supra notes 114-20 and ac-
companying text. Nor does the CTEA supply any defense to those who wish
to disseminate "orphan works" for which the copyright holders cannot be
found. Consequently, if Professor Pollack's interpretation of the meaning of
"progress" in the Intellectual Property Clause is correct, there remains little in
the legislative record to support an inference that Congress acted with the goal
of promoting the dissemination of works, as opposed to lining the pockets of
the owners of old copyrights.
174. See Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, at 468-71.
175. See, e.g., supra note 69 and accompanying text; Opposition Statement,
supra note 31, at 21 ("term extension at most must be given only prospective
application"), available at http://www.law.asu.edu/HomePages/Karjala/
OpposingCopyrightExtension/legmats/1 998statement.html#Incentives.
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the record before Congress to indicate that Congress would, indeed,
adopt purely prospective term extension. There was no lobby for it
prior to enactment of the CTEA, and in view of the total absence of
present value to current authors that such copyright term extension
affords, it is unlikely that any substantial lobby will develop for it in
the future. To sever prospective copyright term extension from the
CTEA as enacted and leave it in force would create the anomaly that
the U.S. public is stuck with a statute that literally no one sought.1
76
VI. CONCLUSION
In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court has both an opportu-
nity and a responsibility to reaffirm our basic constitutional system
of checks and balances by making an independent review of whether
the Copyright Term Extension Act was validly enacted pursuant to
congressional power under the Intellectual Property Clause. The In-
tellectual Property Clause was drafted with important substantive
limitations on federal power to grant exclusive rights of patent and
copyright, designed to insure that Congress did not succumb to the
temptation to effect indirect wealth transfers to rent-seeking special
interests. To uphold the CTEA would permanently remove these ex-
plicit textual limitations on congressional power from the Constitu-
tion because concentrated special interests will always have greater
lobbying resources than self-appointed and uncompensated represen-
tatives of the public interest.
On the other hand, to overturn the CTEA would not take away
from Congress the basic power to resolve the complex policy ten-
sions that will be present in any modem copyright statute. It would
simply remind Congress that, in our system of checks and balances,
Congress's action in the area of intellectual property will be subject
to independent judicial review. This is especially true when Con-
gress's enactment falls under specific provisions incorporated into
176. Moreover, overturning the statute in its entirety enables the Court to as-
sist Congress and the Executive branch in the problem we now face with the
Fairness in Music Licensing Act, which has been found to place the U.S. in
violation of its obligations under the WTO. See supra note 21. On the insev-
erability of prospective and retroactive extension, see Petitioners Brief, supra
note 91, at 48-50; Brief Amici Curiae of the Progressive Intellectual Property
Law Association and Union for the Public Domain at 13-14, Eldred v.
Ashcroft, No. 01-618.
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the Constitution to limit congressional power. This Court can uphold
a subsequently adopted prospective term extension if Congress ar-
ticulates reasons, and supplies a plausible basis for believing them,
that prospective term extension encourages new artistic creativity
and thereby "promote[s] the Progress of Science." There may even
be some cases, less than the across-the-board extensions of existing
copyrights effected by the CTEA, in which Congress can make the
case that retroactive term extension falls within the spirit and letter of
the intellectual property power. However, the broad and indiscrimi-
nate CTEA should be ruled unconstitutional in its entirety.
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